A Selected Survey of the Muslim World 2025
By Professor Mustafa Abu Sway
This selected survey highlights key issues that have affected the Muslim world over the past year. We will examine developments in various countries, regions and by theme. The dramatic events in the Middle East take up much of the coverage, and so it is there that we start.
The Al-Aqsa Mosque and Al-Haram Al-Sharif – The First Qibla, The First Concern: A Target of Escalating Violations
For many years, the Jerusalem Awqaf Department, officially part of the Jordanian Ministry of Awqaf, Islamic Affairs, and Holy Sites, has published regular reports documenting Israeli violations and the growing threats facing the Blessed Al-Aqsa Mosque/Al-Haram Al-Sharif. These reports highlight a pattern of systematic provocations by extremist Jewish settlers, which have intensified particularly in the eastern part of the holy site—an area increasingly feared to be at risk of conversion into a Jewish synagogue.
Such provocations occur regularly, from Sunday to Thursday, and have escalated both in frequency and in severity. During these incursions, the Israeli police and security forces prohibit the presence of Muslim worshippers in the eastern section of Al-Aqsa Mosque/Al-Haram Al-Sharif.
Itamar Ben-Gvir, Israel’s Minister of National Security and leader of the extremist Otzma Yehudit party, continues to make repeated visits to the compound, actions widely viewed as deliberate provocations aimed at inflaming tensions and bolstering his political standing among far-right supporters. In his official capacity—overseeing the Israeli police stationed at the gates of Al-Aqsa Mosque/Al-Haram Al-Sharif and at a police post north of the Dome of the Rock—Ben-Gvir has significantly altered the historical status quo. Under his authority, Jewish extremists have been permitted to pray, sing, dance, blow the shofar (ram’s horn), raise the Israeli flag, and conduct organized tours inside the compound under heavy protection from Israeli police and special forces.
During these incursions, Muslims face severe restrictions on entry, and those already within the compound are often forced to clear the paths for settler groups. Over the past few years, additional punitive measures have targeted Muslim visitors from abroad—particularly from South Africa, who have been denied access to the fajr (dawn) prayer at Al-Aqsa Mosque/Al-Haram Al-Sharif. These restrictions are widely perceived as retaliation against the South African government’s decision to pursue legal action against Israel at the International Criminal Court (ICC) over the genocide in Gaza.
Despite the ongoing and blatant violations within the Al-Aqsa Mosque/Al-Haram Al-Sharif compound, the Israeli Prime Minister continues to pay lip service to the so-called preservation of the status quo. In practice, it is well known that all key decisions regarding the compound emanate directly from the Prime Minister’s Office.
For over 1,400 years, Al-Aqsa Mosque/Al-Haram Al-Sharif—an integral part of the Islamic faith and one of Islam’s three holiest sites—has remained an exclusively Muslim place of worship, safeguarded under the Hashemite Custodianship. Since 1924, the Hashemite Royal Family has assumed responsibility for the care and protection of both Muslim and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem. His Majesty King Abdullah II ibn Al-Hussein currently serves as the Custodian of the Muslim and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem, continuing this historic and religious duty.
The Jordanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has repeatedly lodged formal protests with Israel, condemning these violations and demanding an immediate end to all attempts to alter the established framework governing the site. Independent organizations, including Ir Amim, an Israeli NGO specializing in Jerusalem affairs, have published detailed reports documenting the ongoing erosion of the status quo and warning of the grave consequences such actions pose to regional stability and interfaith coexistence.
Jordan has also maintained success in leading resolutions at UNESCO aimed at protecting Al-Aqsa Mosque/Al-Haram Al-Sharif and preserving its historical identity. Furthermore, diplomatic efforts during meetings between Arab and Muslim leaders and President Donald Trump on the sidelines of the 80th session of the UN General Assembly, in which His Majesty King Abdullah II played a key role, resulted in commitments to support an end to the war in Gaza and to reaffirm the importance of maintaining the status quo at Al-Aqsa Mosque.
His Majesty King Abdullah II has drawn clear red lines regarding the future of Al-Aqsa Mosque/Al-Haram Al-Sharif: “no division and no sharing” of the site under any circumstances.
On 30 March 2013, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas signed an agreement formally recognizing His Majesty King Abdullah II as the Custodian of the Holy Sites in Jerusalem—a custodianship that is widely recognized internationally. This role builds upon the historic bay‘ah (oath of allegiance) pledged in 1924 by Palestinian leaders to Sharif Hussein bin Ali, the Sharif of Mecca, affirming his religious and political responsibility to protect Jerusalem’s holy sites—a duty faithfully upheld by his Hashemite descendants, the Kings of Jordan.
The international community and the Muslim world must act urgently and collectively to safeguard the sanctity of Al-Aqsa Mosque/Al-Haram Al-Sharif. This sacred site is not solely a Palestinian or Jordanian concern, but a matter of profound importance to the entire Muslim Ummah.
Gaza and President Trump’s 20-Point Plan
The abominable human killing and suffering that Israel has carried out in Gaza over the last two years is well-documented. Millions of images of utter destruction, of dead children, of famine stricken tiny bodies, and of children waiting to fill their empty pots at makeshift soup kitchens in the open, are all a testimony to the failure of the international community to stop the genocide.
Hundreds of prominent international organizations and NGOs have called out Israel on its genocide of Gazans. On August 1, 2025, The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories (B’Tselem), the most important Israeli human rights watch group published a statement on its website. The following is a quote from the statement:
“Genocide always occurs within a context: there are conditions that enable it, triggering events, and a guiding ideology. The current onslaught on the Palestinian people, including in the Gaza Strip, must be understood in the context of more than seventy years in which Israel has imposed a violent and discriminatory regime on the Palestinians, taking its most extreme form against those living in the Gaza Strip. Since the State of Israel was established, the apartheid and occupation regime has institutionalized and systematically employed mechanisms of violent control, demographic engineering, discrimination, and fragmentation of the Palestinian collective. These foundations laid by the regime are what made it possible to launch a genocidal attack on the Palestinians immediately after the Hamas-led attack on 7 October 2023.”
The countries that have recognized the State of Palestine stand on the right side of history. It is time for the United States to do the same and help usher in a new era of stability and justice in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. A Reuters/Ipsos poll shows that 58% of Americans believe nations should recognize a Palestinian state. This recognition should not be left to endless negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians—it will not happen. The Likud Party, in an internal vote, unanimously rejected the establishment of a Palestinian state.
President Trump’s initiative, which led to a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, allowed the people of Gaza a brief moment to breathe. Regardless of its shortcomings, the effort demonstrated the seriousness of the U.S. administration in seeking to maintain the ceasefire.
Trump’s 20-point Gaza Peace Plan, however, contains several vague and troubling provisions. Article 7, which conditions the restoration of aid on Hamas’s agreement, is unacceptable. Humanitarian aid—food, water, and medicine—must never be withheld under any circumstance.
Article 19 should have been the plan’s first priority:
“While Gaza redevelopment advances and when the PA reform program is faithfully carried out, the conditions may finally be in place for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood, which we recognize as the aspiration of the Palestinian people.”
Article 18 addresses interfaith dialogue:
“An interfaith dialogue process will be established based on the values of tolerance and peaceful coexistence to change mindsets and narratives of Palestinians and Israelis by emphasizing the benefits that can be derived from peace.”
Interfaith dialogue, however, should not be secondary or subservient to politics. Its participants must highlight truth and justice as prerequisites for genuine peace and confront the ideological and theological justifications for violence, including the misuse of biblical narratives such as the stories of Amalek and Jericho.
Those engaged in interfaith work are not economic advisors to promote the “benefits of peace.” They should instead emphasize respect for human life and dignity, the Golden Rule, and the belief that God does not sanction supremacy or genocide. The United States knows well how Senator George Mitchell labored for 700 days to secure the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland. It is time to revisit that model—its patience, persistence, and the Mitchell Principles that made lasting peace possible.
Iran
Throughout 2024, Israel intensified military operations aimed at striking Iranian assets and their regional allies. Israeli airstrikes repeatedly hit Iranian-backed militias in Syria, seeking to erode Tehran’s military presence in a country whose position had been critically undermined after the collapse of President Assad’s regime. What started as a campaign to assassinate Iranian commanders and sabotage Iran’s nuclear infrastructure through cyberattacks ultimately escalated into direct Israeli airstrikes on Iranian territory on 13 June 2025. For 12 consecutive days, Israel systematically attacked Iranian military assets across the country, including nuclear-related facilities. During this period, Iran responded by launching missiles and drones at Israeli targets.
On 22 June, the United States joined the offensive, striking the Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan nuclear sites using B2 bombers. In retaliation, Iran launched missiles the same day in a calculated strike on the Al-Udeid American airbase in Qatar, after informing both Qatar and the United States in advance. No casualties were reported. The scale of Israeli and American airpower, along with the volume of munitions deployed, likely devastated numerous Iranian targets. Israeli media reported that more than 200 fighter jets dropped over 330 munitions on approximately 100 targets on 13 June alone.
Following the end of this wave of attacks on Iran, it became clear that the Fordow nuclear facility had not been destroyed, and enriched uranium had been relocated elsewhere. According to the IAEA, no new radiation leaks have been detected from Iran’s nuclear sites since the U.S. strikes. On 28 September 2025, the UN Security Council reimposed all nuclear-related sanctions and restrictions on Iran that had previously been lifted under Resolution 2231, which endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. This decision followed the invocation of the snapback mechanism by France, Germany, and the UK, citing Iran’s “significant non-compliance” with its obligations under the agreement. On 20 October 2025, The National reported that Iran annulled the agreement reached with the IAEA in Cairo the previous month, as the agency sought access to investigate potential nuclear weapons development.
Iran has deepened its strategic partnerships with China and Russia. Nevertheless, it is expected that Iran will continue facing sanctions and, likely, renewed conflict in the near future.
Lebanon
One of the greatest challenges facing Lebanon today is the foreign pressure to dismantle Hezbollah’s military wing and integrate it into the Lebanese Army. Hezbollah (Hizballah) operates both as a paramilitary organization and a political party holding 12 parliamentary seats. Along with its allies, it secured 62 seats in the 2022 elections—short of the majority it enjoyed in 2018. Hezbollah is a Twelver Shi‘ite Islamist movement with deep ties to Iran. It was established in 1982, following Israel’s invasion and occupation of southern Lebanon, which forced the Palestine Liberation Organization to relocate to Tunisia. Israel ultimately withdrew from Lebanon in 2000, yet intermittent hostilities persisted, with the Lebanese Army largely remaining on the sidelines.
Hezbollah’s military capabilities expanded into what many describe as a “state within a state,” creating a complex relationship that remains difficult to dismantle.
Three major developments contributed to Hezbollah’s weakening in 2025: the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s predominantly Alawite regime in Syria, Israeli and American strikes against Iran, and Israeli operations targeting Hezbollah, including the assassination of its Secretary-General, Sheikh Hasan Nasrallah, on 27 September 2024.
President General Joseph Aoun urged Hezbollah to disarm, emphasizing that this process must occur through dialogue, even as he assured the United States of his commitment to achieving disarmament. Lebanese Prime Minister Nawwaf Salam echoed President Aoun’s stance, reiterating that weapons must remain solely under state authority.
Since 2006, the United States has invested more than $3 billion in the Lebanese Armed Forces. In early October 2025, Washington pledged an additional $230 million in military aid to the Lebanese army and intelligence agencies to assist in Hezbollah’s disarmament. Private American military consultants—funded by the U.S. Department of Defense—along with British and Canadian advisers, were dispatched to Lebanon as part of a broader security support effort.
Easier said than done. Hezbollah’s new leader, Sheikh Qassem Naim, defiantly declared that “the Resistance will never surrender its weapons while [Israeli] aggression continues; we will fight a Karbala battle if necessary.” In Shi‘ite tradition, Karbala symbolizes ultimate sacrifice, recalling the martyrdom of Husain ibn Ali, the Prophet Muhammad’s grandson, on 10 October 680 CE (10 Muharram 61 AH).
Israel continues to occupy five positions in southern Lebanon.
Libya
The political impasse in Libya continues between the UN-recognised Government of National Unity, based in Tripoli in the west, led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Mohammed Dbeibah, with advisory support from the High State Council, and the eastern-based Government of National Stability, led by Prime Minister Osama Hamad and backed by the House of Representatives and the self-styled Libyan National Army under the command of General Khalifa Haftar. No general elections are forthcoming as the deadlock between the rival governments has persisted since the indefinite postponement of the 2021 elections. Municipal elections took place in 36 municipalities in the west, with high turnout and some municipalities facing security challenges. No municipality elections in the east and the south took place.
To solidify the family’s control over eastern Libya, Khalifa Haftar, who is 79 years old, appointed his son, Saddam Haftar, as Deputy Commander of the General Command. In addition, his brother Khaled was promoted to Chief of Staff. These actions, by creating a strong family structure within the Libyan National Army in the east, could be interpreted as rejecting international attempts to restart the political process to unify Libya.
Qatar
When it comes to protracted conflicts involving state and non-state actors, Qatar has become a household name in conflict resolution, and Doha is now regarded as the capital of mediation. Its reputation as a neutral and trustworthy mediator is unique and rooted in its constitution. Article 7 explicitly makes mediation a key pillar of foreign policy, stating it is “based on the principle of encouraging peaceful resolution of international disputes.”
Over the years, Qatari diplomacy has played a pivotal third-party role in mediating between numerous parties including: the United States and the Taliban to negotiate the US and NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan; intra-Lebanese factions; intra-Palestinian factions; Sudan and Chad; Yemen’s government and the Houthis; Djibouti and Eritrea; Kenya and Somalia; the United States and Iran; Hamas and Israel; and facilitating a peace agreement between DR Congo and Rwanda with U.S. and African Union support. On 17 July 2025, Qatar announced the reunification of Russian and Ukrainian children separated by the war. Even the October 2025 border confrontation between Afghanistan and Pakistan resulted in both countries sending their defence and intelligence chiefs to Doha for mediation.
Therefore, beyond being a violation of international law, it was shocking when Israel attacked Doha on 9 September 2025. The airstrikes targeted Palestinian negotiators and Hamas leaders while they were discussing President Trump’s Gaza proposal. There were casualties, but the assassination attempt failed and became a watershed moment. Is dependence on the United States for security still sustainable in the long term?
The U.S. operates Al-Udeid, the largest military airbase in the Middle East, hosting CENTCOM’s forward headquarters. Qatar supports NATO and cooperates with the U.S. on Gulf security. Hosting Hamas leaders in Doha had international approval. Arab League and Organisation of Islamic Cooperation leaders met in Doha on 15 September in solidarity, but their statement lacked concrete action and the GCC’s activation of its defence pact was largely symbolic. Countries who are part of the Abraham Accords did not recall ambassadors or downgrade ties with Israel.
On 29 September, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu apologized to the Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani for the attack during a call from the White House with President Trump. This helped Qatar resume its mediation efforts, eventually contributing to a ceasefire in Gaza.
Saudi Arabia
On September 17, 2025, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a strategic mutual defence pact. It took place one week after Israel attacked Qatar. Though security cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan is not new, there are close to 2,000 Pakistani officers and soldiers in Saudi Arabia, the pact reflects the Gulf countries’ dissatisfaction with the US position for not preventing the attack on Doha.
Saudi Arabia co-hosted with France the United Nations summit on the question of the State of Palestine and implementing the two-state solution, during the UN General Assembly 80th session, which began on September 23, 2025. Many key western countries recognized the State of Palestine. Four of the permanent members of the UN Security Council recognize Palestine. Only the USA does not! The recognition of the State of Palestine as unfolded lately is a game changer. It carries a great symbolic meaning, political weight, and juridical implications. It represents a failure of Israel’s diplomacy and a shift in world opinion. More than three quarters of the UN member states recognize the State of Palestine. As HM King Abdullah II said during his speech at the UNGA, it is “an indisputable right, not a reward”.
Politically, Saudi Arabia was perceived to be on the cusp of formalizing diplomatic relations with Israel, a monumental shift in regional dynamics. However, the ongoing war on Gaza has stalled the normalization process. Saudi Arabia has instead positioned itself as a key player in demanding an immediate ceasefire and the establishment of a Palestinian state. During the 2024 United Nations General Assembly, Saudi Arabia, alongside other Arab nations, led a coalition advocating for Palestinian sovereignty, underscoring its stance on the issue.
Economically, Vision 2030 remains central to Saudi Arabia’s future ambitions. The plan seeks to diversify the kingdom’s economy away from its dependence on oil. At its core is Neom, a futuristic city designed as a 170-kilometre linear structure, set to rise 500 meters above the ground, with zero carbon emissions. Despite being hailed as a revolutionary urban design, practical challenges have led to the initial phase being scaled down to a more manageable 2.5 kilometers by 2030. Foreign investment remains crucial for the realization of such ambitious projects, with Saudi Arabia actively seeking global partnerships.
Saudi Arabia is constructing the world’s largest green hydrogen plant, the NEOM Green Hydrogen Project, in Oxagon, within the NEOM development in north-western Saudi Arabia. It is 80% complete and is set to be operational in 2026. It is totally powered by solar and wind energy and will produce 600 tones of green hydrogen per day, making Saudi Arabia a leading country in renewable energy, though hydrogen is still not competitive compared to fossil fuel.
On the domestic front, unemployment among Saudi nationals was 7.6% in Q1 2024, reduced to 6.8% in Q2 2025. Saudi policies aim at replacing foreign workers with Saudi citizens in various sectors.
Sudan
The civil war in Sudan entered its 3rd year in April 2005. What began as a serious attempt by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to rule over all Sudan by fighting the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), seems to have shifted recently into a more modest goal of de facto establishing governmental institutions in the areas under the control of the RSF, preparing the scene for splitting the country.
On 30 August 2025, Mohamad Hamdan Dagalo, the leader of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), was sworn in as head of a parallel Sudanese government. This move could lead to a situation like Libya, further complicating the conflict with the Sudanese Army and threatening to divided Sudan once more in its contemporary history, which previously saw the secession and independence of South Sudan in 2011.
This parallel government includes coalition partners, including the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-north (SPLM-N), the largest non-state armed group in Sudan. Its leader, Abdelaziz al-Hilu, was appointed as vice-president. The African Union and the Arab League condemned this initiative. Still, the Arab countries are not united in their practical approach and appear divided in what side they support, including providing military assistance to the warring parties.
The RSF traces its origins to the Janjaweed militia, employed by the Omar al-Bashir regime during the Darfur conflict. The Janjaweed were accused of genocide and ethnic cleansing, displacing millions of non-Arab Sudanese. The RSF has reportedly recruited fighters from ethnically affiliated tribes across borders, as well as foreign mercenaries, including some allegedly from Colombia.
Arms continue to flow to the RSF. According to Reuters, the group has deployed at least ten drones in Nyala, its de facto capital. On 19 September 2025, a drone strike during dawn prayers at Al-Safiya Mosque in El-Fasher killed more than 70 worshippers, including children. Although the RSF was blamed, it denied responsibility. Just days later, on 24 September, another drone attack on an El-Fasher market killed 27 civilians. The RSF has besieged El-Fasher for over a year, frequently attacking nearby refugee camps. UNICEF estimates that by late August, 600,000 people had been displaced from the city. On 11 October, at least 57 people—including 22 women and 17 children—were killed when RSF forces attacked the Dar Al-Arqam displacement centre in El-Fasher, according to Sudanese medical groups.
Following several military defeats, the RSF has reportedly withdrawn from northern and eastern Sudan, including Khartoum, maintaining its strongest presence in Kordofan and Darfur.
In July 2025, the International Criminal Court (ICC) briefed the UN Security Council, stating that war crimes and crimes against humanity were ongoing in Darfur. Attacks on civilians and widespread sexual violence persist across Sudan, particularly in Darfur. Simultaneously, outbreaks of cholera, dengue fever, malaria, measles, polio, and rubella have surged due to the collapse of the healthcare system.
On 6 October 2025, the ICC convicted Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (Ali Kushayb)—a Janjaweed commander whose forces evolved into the RSF—of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including murder, rape, torture, and forced displacement for his role in Darfur two decades ago. The RSF, critics note, continues to employ many of the same brutal tactics today.
Syria
The Assad regime collapsed on 8 December 2024 following a major offensive by opposition forces led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and supported by the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA). The campaign marked a turning point in the Syrian civil war, which began during the Arab Spring pro-democracy uprisings.
Before the offensive, Syria was split among the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the northeast, the SNA in the north, HTS in the northwest, and the Assad government in central and southern areas. HTS advanced rapidly with minimal resistance.
On 10 March 2025, interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa signed a U.S.-brokered agreement with Mazloum Abdi of the SDF to integrate Kurdish forces into state institutions. The YPG sought special military units, but this was rejected. Sporadic clashes followed in Aleppo’s Sheikh Maqsood and Ashrafiyyeh districts until a ceasefire was reached on 7 October, after talks with U.S. officials and CENTCOM.
Calls for federalization persist, but Türkiye opposes any autonomous Kurdish region along its border and resumed airstrikes in September. There are four major Kurdish regions—in Türkiye, Syria, Iraq, and Iran—with past attempts at autonomy, such as the Soviet-era “Red Kurdistan,” forcibly ended. On 29 March 2025, Ahmad Al-Sharaa formed a transitional government under a five-year constitutional framework, replacing the caretaker cabinet of Mohammad al-Bashir.
Following Assad’s fall, Israel intensified airstrikes on Syrian military sites. The new government avoided retaliation, signaling it “does not seek confrontation.” Israel occupied additional territory near the Golan Heights and supported Druze leader Al-Hajiri in creating a semi-autonomous entity in Sweida, where Israeli flags were raised. Reuters reported Israeli financial and military aid to Druze separatists. The UN documented grave abuses against Druze civilians since July 2025, including killings, abductions, and sexual violence. A U.S.-Jordanian mediation produced an accord affirming Syria’s territorial integrity and promising protection for Druze communities.
Israel–Syria negotiations are underway: Damascus demands a return to the 1974 armistice lines, while Israel seeks a buffer zone near the Golan. The Heights, occupied since 1967 and annexed in 1981, remain Syrian under international law, despite U.S. recognition in 2019. Refugees from Türkiye, Lebanon, and Jordan have begun returning. On 5 October 2025, parliamentary elections were held for 121 of 210 seats; most winners were Sunni Muslims. Voting was postponed in Kurdish and Druze areas, leaving 21 seats vacant.
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE pledged over $10 billion for reconstruction, also settling Syria’s World Bank arrears and funding public-sector salaries through the UNDP, with U.S. approval.
Yemen
The civil war in Yemen has entered its tenth year, creating one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, with millions facing famine, displacement, and disease. Since 2014, Yemen has been torn between the internationally recognized government and Houthi militants (formally the Ansar Allah movement). A fragile truce brokered in 2022 reduced large-scale hostilities but has failed to end the conflict, with violations continuing by both sides. At the 80th UN General Assembly, Dr. Rashad Al-Alimi, Chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), voiced frustration with the stalemate, stating:
“After repeated failures of peace initiatives, it has become imperative to move collectively and decisively toward imposing peace. Therefore, I call today for the establishment of an effective international coalition to restore Yemen’s security and stability—a coalition that rebuilds state institutions and liberates our country from the grip of militias and terrorist organizations of every kind.”
Meanwhile, Aidarous Al-Zubaidi, Deputy Chairman of the PLC and President of the Southern Transitional Council (STC)—which holds three seats in the Council—told The National (24 Sept. 2025) that declaring an independent southern Yemeni state would pave the way for joining the Abraham Accords, allowing the south to “make its own foreign policy decisions.” He asserted that all conditions for statehood were now in place. The peace process remains stalled, as neither side appears willing to compromise. Regional powers continue to use Yemen as a proxy battleground for their competing geopolitical agendas. Ordinary Yemenis remain the chief victims—caught between airstrikes, famine, and the collapse of essential services.
Yemen’s vocal support for Gaza has made it a target of U.S., U.K., and Israeli airstrikes. Repeated attacks have struck Sanaa International Airport, Hudaydah port, power plants, and other vital infrastructure. On 28 August 2025, the Israeli Air Force bombed a gathering of senior Houthi officials in Sanaa during a televised speech by Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, killing Houthi Prime Minister Ahmad al-Rahawi and several ministers.
On 6 May 2025, Oman announced it had mediated a ceasefire between the United States and the Houthis, under which both parties agreed to halt attacks on one another, ensuring freedom of navigation for U.S. vessels. The Houthis, however, explicitly excluded Israel from the deal, vowing to continue targeting Israeli interests as long as the war in Gaza persisted.
Sub-Saharan Africa
Africa is the richest continent in the world. Africa is the poorest continent. Both statements are true. Africa is not the primary benefactor from its gold, oil, uranium, and diamonds resulting in twenty-two of the twenty-eight poorest countries in the world being in Africa. Colonial legacy, weak governments, fragile state institutions, coup d’états, rigging elections, violating constitutions and democratic norms, coupled with struggling economies, are fertile grounds for breeding violent non-state actors, including Islamist movements. Africa has 50 active armed conflicts, amounting to 40% of all armed conflicts in the world, resulting in 35 million refugees in Africa. The International Red Cross does not have enough resources to aid all refugees, especially that the USA dismantled the USAID agency in 2025, cutting thousands of projects around the world, putting millions of vulnerable people at risk. Africa was hit hard.
France withdrew from the Sahel region, and so did the Americans, exposing the countries to the spread of Jihadist movements. The Russians filled the vacuum with bilateral agreements with its Africa Corps, a group that is the successor to the notorious Wagner Group and reportedly directed by the Russian Ministry of Defence. China and Türkiye are also vying to expand their footprint in the region.
The armed conflict in the Central Sahel, driven by jihadist groups, has spread across borders, displacing over 200,000 people from Mali to neighboring countries. In July 2025, a major armed group expanded its attacks into western Mali, reaching border towns near Senegal and Mauritania.
The threat is spilling over into coastal countries like Benin and Togo, with significant increases in violent extremist events near their borders. In Central Africa, groups like the Islamic State Central African Province (ISCAP) have a presence in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) among many insurgent groups, some with Rwanda’s support. Al-Shabab continues to be the dominant Islamist group in Somalia and the Horn of Africa, with known attacks across the border into Ethiopia and Kenya.
Not all insurgencies are rooted in Islamic jihadist ideology. Historically, the primary conflict in Mali originated in the Tuareg’s quest for self-determination by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, which claims to represent other ethnic minorities. It is only in 2012 that Islamist forces emerged among the Tuareg. After a period of alliance between the secular and Islamist Tuaregs, they fought among each other, with the secularists losing the war.
Despite having the Alliance for the Sahel States, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger suffered from increased attacks in 2025 on military bases and civilian centers. Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), an Al-Qaida affiliate, carried out a series of large-scale and coordinated attacks across Burkina Faso and Mali. On 11 May, militants overran a military base in Djibo town, in Burkina Faso, killing up to 200 soldiers, and in a town west of Djibo they reportedly killed 60 soldiers.
In the first half of 2025, the militants, who now use drones, killed 1,680 people in Burkina Faso, 1,102 in Niger, and 645 in Mali. The deteriorating security situation in Burkina Faso’s contradicts the strong revolutionary image of its charismatic leader Captain Ibrahim Traoré, who is much loved at home and abroad. He is an anti-western, pan-African leader, a social media savvy who shows up in military fatigue in meetings with African leaders, and abroad. He pursues leftist economic plans, nationalizing gold mines, and slightly improving the economy, spending more on public health and education.
The Al-Shabaab militants in Somalia have adopted new tactics, infiltrating a military base in February 2025 in Mogadishu. The new tactics are a response to the counter-insurgency efforts by the state, which has overstretched its resources. There are reports that al-Shabaab infiltrated the government security forces, gathering intelligence, undermining the government plans. On 18 March, there was a failed attempt to assassinate President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud using a roadside bomb. President Mohamud said in an interview with BBC that there have been five attempts on his life within the last two years, highlighting the deteriorating security situation. On 18 May, a suicide bomber targeted a queue of young recruits registering at the Damanyo military base in the Somali capital Mogadishu, killing more than 10 people.
In Nigeria, two major militant groups, Islamic State West Africa (ISWA) and Boko Haram, including its rebranded splinter group, the Islamic State in the West African Province (ISWAP) pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. Boko Haram is mostly active in Nigeria but also carries out attacks in neighboring countries around the Lake Chad Basin, specifically Cameroon, Chad, and Niger.
On 6 September 2025, fighters believed to be from Boko Haram slaughtered at least 55 people including six soldiers in an attack on Darul Jama, a Muslim village in northeastern Nigeria’s Borno State where people had recently returned after years of displacement. The Nigerian government established the Agro Rangers, along with a trench surrounding the farmland, to protect farmers against the onslaught of Boko Haram. Other soldiers fled the village. The fighters arrived on motorbikes, shooting indiscriminately, and setting homes ablaze, killing men and leaving women behind.
According to a tally by Good Governance Africa, a nonprofit, the first six months of 2025 saw a resurgence in activity from armed groups. It charted about 300 attacks – mainly from ISWAP – that killed about 500 civilians. Security, especially in the predominantly Muslim north of Nigeria, has been deteriorating for years. Some 10,000 people have been killed and hundreds abducted since Bola Tinubu became Nigeria’s president in mid-2023. The violence has pushed as many as 3 million people out of their homes. In the Middle Belt region many lives were lost. In July, attackers stormed the farming village of Yelwata in Benue, killing at least 160 people. The fertile region sits at the fault line of Nigeria’s deepening farmer vs. herder crisis where mostly Christian farmers and mostly Muslim Fulani herders have a long history of tension and clashes. Attacks and reprisals on both sides go back decades and have grown deadly. Christian farming communities bear the brunt of the violence and accuse the government of failing to acknowledge the scale, including the ethnic and territorial undertones of the crisis.
US Senator Ted Cruz accused Nigeria of facilitating mass murder of Christians, and he is rallying Evangelical Christians to demand that the Congress designates Nigeria as a violator of religious freedom. On 17 October 2025, The Washington Post refuted his claim as “unfounded” and that the “data disagrees”.
There is a security crisis from Senegal in West Africa all the way to Somalia in the Horn of Africa, and beyond. There are many studies, meetings, and declarations, yet not enough resources are dedicated to developing these countries, to improve services, to implement democratic norms, to get rid of corruption, and address the mistrust between governments and peoples.
Asia
Bangladesh
Since gaining independence, Bangladesh, a country highly vulnerable to natural disasters and historically impoverished, has been classified as one of the world’s Least Developed Countries (LDCs) under UN criteria. It is set to graduate from this status in November 2026, marking a significant milestone following the end of Sheikh Hasina’s authoritarian regime in August 2024. While this graduation reflects Bangladesh’s economic progress, it also presents new challenges, as the country will lose LDC-specific trade privileges, potentially impacting exports, and development funding.
The country is currently facing an ongoing flood crisis, which began in mid-May 2025, driven by heavy monsoon rains and upstream water flows from India. On 14 May 2025, the World Bank’s Board of Executive Directors approved $270 million in financing to support flood recovery and enhance resilience against future disasters. This assistance will fund the rehabilitation of critical infrastructure, strengthening of agricultural systems, and livelihood support for communities devastated by the August 2024 floods.
Politically, the interim government, led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, banned the Awami League under the Anti-Terrorism Act on 10 May 2025. Later, in October 2025, the party’s student wing, the Bangladesh Chhatra League, was also designated a “terrorist organization” for its role in violent attacks on protesters during the uprising that led to the ouster of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who subsequently fled to India.
The plight of Rohingya refugees remains critical. Nearly one million Rohingyas reside in the Kutupalong refugee camp in Cox’s Bazar, facing severe shortages of clean water, sanitation, and healthcare due to the scale and speed of their arrivals from Myanmar. As Bangladesh’s 2026 elections approach, some politicians have pledged to repatriate Rohingya refugees, even as new waves continue to flee Myanmar, where border towns are increasingly being burned.
Pakistan
On 22 April 2025, a deadly militant attack in Indian-administered Kashmir killed 26 tourists. India blamed Pakistan, which denied responsibility. On 7 May, India launched missile strikes on nine sites in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir, triggering four days of intense fighting that ended with a ceasefire on 10 May. In July, Anil Chauhan, Chief of Defence Staff of the Indian Armed Forces, admitted that Indian jetfighters, including advanced French Rafales, were downed by the Pakistani Air Force, reportedly using Chinese fighter jets—an outcome that likely contributed to the swift halt of hostilities.
On 23 April 2025, India unilaterally suspended the Indus Water Treaty, a landmark 1960 agreement governing the sharing of Indus basin waters. Though India currently lacks the infrastructure to cut off water supplies, any future disruption could trigger a full-scale war. De-escalation requires addressing the core issue of Kashmir’s status.
Pakistan faces multiple internal challenges: poverty, economic mismanagement, soaring inflation, high foreign debt, dysfunctional institutions, a biased judiciary, pervasive corruption, military interference in politics, and militant activity. Militant groups, particularly Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), operate near the Afghan border and in Balochistan, attacking military convoys, looting weapons, and kidnapping security personnel. On 13 September 2025, a TTP attack killed 12 soldiers and seized arms; on average, the group carries out more than one attack per day.
On 9 October 2025, two large explosions struck Kabul, Afghanistan, followed by a third in Paktika province near the Pakistani border. Violence escalated along the Durand Line, marking the worst clashes between Afghanistan and Pakistan since the Taliban’s takeover in 2021. A ceasefire was agreed on 19 October in Doha, with a follow-up meeting scheduled for 25 October in Istanbul to negotiate a detailed agreement. Simultaneously, India announced plans to reopen its embassy in Kabul, suspended since 2021, signalling a renewed diplomatic engagement. Afghan officials visited New Delhi, while Pakistan and India may be extending their historical rivalry into Afghanistan, compounded by the TTP threat to Islamabad.
On 17 September 2025, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a strategic mutual defence pact, building on decades of military cooperation. Though nuclear capabilities were not explicitly mentioned, the agreement covers all defence contingencies.
In October 2025, Pakistan invited the U.S. to invest in the $1.2 billion Pasni Port project on the Arabian Sea. The initiative focuses on financial and logistical cooperation, without provisions for U.S. military bases. Critics argue that Pakistan’s reliance on foreign assistance reflects domestic structural deficiencies. The Pasni Port is strategically near Gwadar Port, operated by China Overseas Port Holding as part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
Following the ouster of former Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in 2024, Pakistan engaged with Bangladesh, signalling a potential new trilateral alignment between Pakistan, Bangladesh, and China, which could further isolate India in South Asia.
Islamophobia in Europe and the Americas
In 1750, Jan Jacque Rousseau, in a prize-winning essay “A Discourse on the Moral Effects of the Arts and Sciences” he wrote to the academy of Dijon, said:
“Europe had relapsed into the barbarism of the earliest ages; the inhabitants of this part of the world, which is at present so highly enlightened, were plunged, some centuries ago, in a state still worse than ignorance. A scientific jargon, more despicable than mere ignorance, had usurped the name of knowledge, and opposed an almost invincible obstacle to its restoration. Things had come to such a pass, that it required a complete revolution to bring men back to common sense. This came at last from the quarter from which it was least to be expected. It was the stupid Mussulman (i.e., Muslim), the eternal scourge of letters, who was the immediate cause of their revival among us.”
Of course, for the Islamic civilization to save Europe from the Dark Ages, and to prompt European renaissance, is anything but stupid. Rousseau’s image of the other, the Muslim, belongs to general bias. An early, but not rare, moment of Islamophobia, which has echoed over the centuries by many prominent Europeans. Europe came to be as such in its encounter with Muslims.
Erasing the Islamic civilization when using the “Judeo-Christian civilization” political construct is Islamophobic. Civilizations are cumulative, and one builds on another. Convivencia is an inclusive civilizational paradigm. It was born in Andalusia and Baghdad, where otherness was softened, especially vis-à-vis the People of the Book. Equal opportunity in scientific and academic fields, in trade and medicine, assuming public offices, as well as having familial and social relations along are integral to the Islamic worldview.
The Holy Qur’an goes beyond tolerance when dealing with ethnicities. Human physical appearance referred to as color, along with languages, are divine signs to be celebrated:
“And of His signs is the creation of the heavens and the earth and the diversity of your languages and your colors. Indeed, in that are signs for those of knowledge“. Surah Ar-Rum (30:22)
European geography became a Eurocentric identity, based on “whiteness”. During the colonial period, Europe went out and colonized the world. When things changed for the better and the world got rid of European colonialism, Europe adopted a reclusive stance, closing its doors, or wanted to close them, in the face of the other. But the other, the immigrant, kept coming, by land, sea, and air, sometimes invited, and they stayed. Can the other become European? This is not about citizenship which the majority of Muslims in Europe have. This is about acceptance without erasure, without discrimination, without having to give up part of Muslim identity or religion.
Aristotle Kallis of the UK’s Keele University, who specializes in far-right ideologies and political discourse, stresses that the current surge in anti-Muslim sentiment in Europe is not merely reactive but rather an acceleration of long-existing trends.
“It has remained at very, very high levels ever since,” he explains, referring to anti-Muslim hatred. “It was not a spike, so it didn’t go up and then come down.”
According to Kallis, social media has become a primary battleground, emboldening far-right actors.
“They’re now using far more sophisticated techniques in social media to stir up hatred within the communities … There’s no major political party of the far right, but you have all these grassroots organizations with links to social media that are stirring up hatred,”.
He cites the outbreaks of violence and unrest in British cities such as Leicester in 2022 and Southport a year later as clear examples of an increasingly fractured society.
Islamophobia is on the rise in the EU where 26 million Muslims live. According to the EU Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) survey, one-third of Muslim citizens have difficulty finding jobs and housing. One in two Muslims is a victim of discrimination in daily life.
The FRA report reveals significant differences in the 13 member states surveyed: Austria is the most Islamophobic, with 71 percent of Muslims targeted, followed by Germany and Finland. The rate of racial discrimination drops steeply in Spain and Italy, the countries with the lowest levels. In general, the most affected are young Muslims and women who wear religious clothing. Intertwined in the Islamophobic behavior of EU citizens are not only religious elements but also the skin color and ethnic or immigrant background of the European Muslim population. “A phenomenon fueled by the conflicts in the Middle East and made worse by the dehumanizing anti-Muslim rhetoric we see across the continent,” said the director of the EU Agency, Sirpa Rautio.
Some media outlets play a negative role by spreading Islamophobic narratives, including attempts to silence the use of “Islamophobia” itself. On 20 October 2025, Paul Goodman published an op-ed titled “Islam has been a problem in Britain for a long time. It’s time to face up to that” in The Telegraph. It has the following statement:
“And while a determined response to anti-Muslim prejudice and violence is required, the very concept of Islamophobia, which threatens free expression, must be resisted.” The title, using “Islam” is a typical case where religion is blamed for the action of individuals. Had he said “Muslims”, it would be a fallacy of overgeneralization. It will also be problematic because the religion of non-Muslims who commit objectionable acts are rarely mentioned. And the claim that the use of “Islamophobia” threatens free speech, is itself a threat to free speech.
Other fair articles could be used as a counter argument. On 25 July 2025, Zoe Williams, a columnist for the Guardian wrote an article “Islamophobia isn’t just socially acceptable in the UK now-it is flourishing. How did this happen?” She reflected on a recent poll that found 41% of the British public believe that Muslim immigrants have had a negative impact on the UK. Nearly half (49%) think that Muslim women are pressured to wearing the hijab. And almost a third (31%) think that Islam promotes violence. She reveals that there is a slide in British society from “Muslim extremists have views incompatible with British life” to “all Muslims”.
This Islamophobic change did not happen on its own. It was deliberately manufactured in the United States and then spread to the UK, she said: “The US lab created this virus, and we caught it”.
It was manufactured. She referenced a 2015 US thinktank Center for American Progress publication Fear, Inc 2.0: The Islamophobia Network’s Efforts to Manufacture Hate in America.
Islamophobia results in demonization of Muslims in the UK public service broadcasting, where “Muslims lives are considered less valuable than non-Muslim ones, and their loss less tragic.” In subtler ways, she concludes, this casual demonisation puffs up a notion of “British values” that are nowhere in evidence, nowhere defended, except in the supposed dichotomy with a Muslim worldview.
Islamophobia in the US is also on the rise, with new trends. On 11 March 2025, CAIR, the Council on American-Islamic Relations, published its “2025 Civil Rights Report: Unconstitutional Crackdown.”
On the positive side, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 9-0 in favor of CAIR’s arguments against the federal No Fly List. Attorneys representing individuals impacted by President Trump’s 2017 Muslim Ban reached a major agreement for nearly 25,000 affected individuals. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) acted to prohibit the sale of sensitive location data from Muslim app users, protecting their privacy and preventing its misuse for surveillance.
Muslims constitute 0.1% of South America, compared to 1.1% in the USA. Islamophobia in South America is less prevalent than in North America or Europe. Anti-Muslim sentiment in the region has historical roots dating back to the Spanish and Portuguese Inquisitions and has been more recently amplified by geopolitical events and local political rhetoric.
Brazil, like numerous other nations, grapples with mounting Islamophobia, according to a recent survey by the Anthropology Group on Islamic and Arab Contexts, an organisation affiliated with the University of São Paulo, incidents of harassment among Muslim Brazilians have surged since October 7th. This mirrors the same trend in Europe and the USA.
Muslim communities in the Triple Frontier (Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay) suffered from the American “War on Terror” rhetoric which influenced policies in SA and led to surveillance. Political rhetoric can also fuel these prejudices, such as when former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro promoted anti-Muslim narratives.
On the other hand, they successfully mobilized with support from local civil society to counter stereotyped images associating them with terrorism. Some governments are beginning to act. In Brazil, for example, a study on Islamophobia was presented to the Ministry of Human Rights and Citizenship to inform government policy. Argentina has also seen government institutions partner with anti-Islamophobia activists.
In 201, Argentina passed a law protecting women’s right to wear the hijab in public, following advocacy efforts. This could be compared to France’s ban on hijab in public institutions, or the anti-Shari`ah laws that some states in the USA have passed for political reasons and as part of political campaigns. Muslims never attempted to impose Shari`ah laws in the USA. On the other hand, how could close to 1% of the population do that.
Conclusion
A multilateral summit of the leaders of the United States and eight Arab States and State members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) was convened at United Nations Headquarters on the margins of the High-Level Week of the 80th session of the United Nations General Assembly.
The Arab and Muslim leaders emphasized the need to end the war in Gaza, rejecting forced displacement, and stressed President Trump’s leadership to achieve a just and lasting peace.
These leaders, including HM King Abdullah II ibn Al-Hussein of Jordan, and Custodian of the Muslim and Christian Holy Sites in Jerusalem, emphasized the need to work out details of a plan for stabilization, while ensuring stability in the West Bank and Jerusalem’s Holy Sites.
Leaders of the member states of the OIC can make a difference in the protection of Jerusalem Holy Sites, by rallying behind Jordan, in its effort to protect and serve these Holy Sites, including Al-Aqsa Mosque/Al-Haram Al-Sharif, which is under imminent threat.
The Arab and Muslim leaders are very able to address the pressing issues facing the Muslim Ummah through the Organization of Islamic Conference, and other forums. Among these are the many armed conflicts in the Arab and Muslim world, between neighboring countries, internal civil wars, and the ongoing onslaught of Israel on Arab countries, to which Qatar was added this year.
There is a need to revive, expand, and improve the defense agreements, within a paradigm of unity, to provide deterrence. This is a pressing issue, as the world, represented by the UNSCs could not end the Russia-Ukrainian conflict, which could still deteriorate, posing a higher risk. The UN and the international community are not dependable. They could not stop the genocide in Gaza as it unfolded live on TV. These are other than the states that were involved directly and knowingly in sustaining it. The latter should pay reparations according to their share in supporting the genocide.
The security of the Arab and Muslim world, as one eco-system, cannot be achieved through bilateral agreements, or by shifting alliances in an emerging multipolar world order, if at all.
Professor Abu Sway frequently lectures globally as well as in the heart of Jerusalem, Palestine, at Al-Masjid Al-Aqsa. He is a member of Hashemite Fund for the Restoration of Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock, the Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought, and the Islamic Waqf Council in Jerusalem. He is author of three books on Imam Al-Ghazali: Islamic Epistemology: The Case of Al-Ghazali, Fatawa Al-Ghazali (Arabic) and A Treasury of Al-Ghazali.