A Selected Survey of the Muslim World 2026

Professor Mustafa Abu Sway

This survey highlights the major issues impacting the Muslim world over the past year. Looking at key developments through regional, national, and thematic lenses, we begin in the Middle East—the region that dominates much of this year’s focus.

Al-Aqsa Mosque/Al-Haram Al-Sharif: Theology, Politics of Preservation, and the Hashemite Custodianship

Al-Aqsa Mosque/Al-Haram Al-Sharif stands as one of Islam’s three holiest sites. The compound covers 144 dunams in the Old City of Jerusalem. This sacred site includes the Umayyad Qibli Mosque, Mamluk and Ottoman schools, massive subterranean prayer halls, open courtyards adorned with water fountains, walls framed by minarets, and the iconic golden Dome of the Rock, gilded by the late Hashemite King Hussein of Jordan, which continues to define Jerusalem aesthetically.

The historic understanding of the site extends to the entire compound rather than a single building. The 15th-century qadi and historian Mujir al-Din al-Hanbali (d. 1522) observed in his history of Jerusalem and Hebron, Al-Uns al-Jalil fi Tarikh al-Quds wal-Khalil, that, “Al-Aqsa Mosque” is the name of the entire defined space. He measured the compound wall-to-wall, spanning from Bab al-Rahmah (the Gate of Mercy or Golden Gate) in the east to the ancient Tankaziyyah School in the west—a historic Mamluk-era building confiscated by Israel after the 1967 war that led to the occupation of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip.

Al-Aqsa Mosque/Al-Haram Al-Sharif remains a focal point of regional and international tension, driven by concerns over Israeli actions that alter the historic status quo. Israel acknowledged established arrangements that only Muslims are allowed to worship throughout the compound. Non-Muslims are permitted to visit under the supervision of the Jerusalem Islamic Awqaf department, which is officially part of Jordan’s Ministry of Awqaf, Islamic Affairs, and Holy Places.

The Hashemite Custodianship of the Muslim and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem is formally recognised through major international treaties, multilateral bodies, and global consensus. No sovereign country officially and explicitly rejects or opposes Jordan’s Hashemite custodianship of the holy sites in Jerusalem in formal diplomacy. Israel itself formally recognised Jordan’s special and historic role in Jerusalem’s Muslim holy sites under Article 9 of the 1994 Israel–Jordan Peace Treaty. It notes that Israel respects the present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in Muslim holy shrines in Jerusalem, and will give high priority to the Jordanian historic role when negotiations on permanent status take place. In addition, the State of Palestine signed a formal agreement in 2013 with HM King Abdullah II reaffirming Jordan’s custodianship over both Islamic and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem. International recognition is reflected by the Arab League (22 member states), the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) (57 member states), the European Union (EU) (27 member states), and key Western nations, including the United States, all of which explicitly support the preservation of the historic status quo under Hashemite custodianship.

Jordan and other Muslim-majority nations strongly oppose illegal settlers’ actions that alter the site’s religious character or undermine Awqaf oversight, with concerns intensifying following non-Muslim prayer attempts, Israeli police operations within the compound, and inflammatory political statements.

International bodies, particularly UNESCO, have repeatedly addressed the administrative status, nomenclature, and cultural heritage of the site. UNESCO resolutions (such as executive board decisions in 2016 and subsequent sessions) officially refer to the compound as “Al-Aqsa Mosque/Al-Haram Al-Sharif”, defining the entire 144-dunam area as a single, integral Muslim holy site of worship within the World Heritage site of the Old City of Jerusalem. UNESCO decisions consistently call for the preservation of the historic status quo that prevailed prior to September 2000 (i.e., the status quo ante), emphasising the exclusive authority of the Jordan-managed Jerusalem Islamic Awqaf over the administration, maintenance, and control of access to the compound. Furthermore, UNESCO considers all administrative, legal, or physical measures aimed at altering the character, legal status, or historic identity of the compound to be null and void under international law, calling on Israel as the occupying power to allow for the restoration of the historic status quo under which the Jordanian Awqaf exercised exclusive authority across all affairs relating to the site.

Gaza: Humanitarian Catastrophe and Destruction of Palestinian Collective Life

B’Tselem, the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, recently described Gaza as the centre of a deliberate campaign that has combined mass killing, large-scale displacement, destruction of basic infrastructure, severe bodily and mental harm, and the dismantling of educational, cultural, social, and family institutions. Its Gaza overview frames the crisis as a man-made humanitarian disaster shaped by Israeli policy, emphasising that restrictions on daily life, devastated infrastructure, and extreme poverty have created conditions in which civilian survival itself is at risk. Testimonies gathered by B’Tselem from Gaza residents underscore the lived consequences of this crisis: food kitchens have been reduced, families queue for scarce meals, children’s schooling has been disrupted, and ordinary life has narrowed around finding food, water, shelter, and medical care. In this account, Gaza is not merely a battlefield but a society whose institutions and basic conditions for life have been systematically destroyed. In its report titled ‘Our Genocide’, B’Tselem said:

“Since October 2023, Israel has shifted its policy toward the Palestinians. Its military onslaught on Gaza, underway for more than 21 months, has included mass killing, both directly and through creating unliveable conditions, serious bodily or mental harm to an entire population, decimation of basic infrastructure throughout the Strip, and forcible displacement on a huge scale, with ethnic cleansing added to the list of official war objectives.

This is compounded by mass arrests and abuse of Palestinians in Israeli prisons, which have effectively become torture camps, and tearing apart the social fabric of Gaza, including the destruction of Palestinian educational and cultural institutions. The campaign is also an assault on Palestinian identity itself, through the deliberate destruction of refugee camps and attempts to undermine the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA).

An examination of Israel’s policy in the Gaza Strip and its horrific outcomes, together with statements by senior Israeli politicians and military commanders about the goals of the attack, leads to the unequivocal conclusion that Israel is taking coordinated, deliberate action to destroy Palestinian society in the Gaza Strip. In other words: Israel is committing genocide against the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.”

In the West Bank, B’Tselem’s September 2026 report ‘The Elimination Project’ argues that Israeli policy has entered a new phase since late 2022 and especially since October 2023, using mutually reinforcing mechanisms of violence, intimidation, territorial takeover, movement restrictions, and institutionalised dispossession to dismantle Palestinian collective life. The report presents these developments as a single political project rather than isolated incidents. B’Tselem’s settler-violence documentation states that since October 7, 2023, military attacks and settler violence have displaced Palestinian communities in the West Bank on a scale not seen since the beginning of the occupation in 1967, including dozens of fully or partially displaced communities. Its reporting also describes joint attacks by armed settlers and military forces, including assaults on Palestinian villages, injuries, livestock theft, and destruction of property, as central to the process of forced displacement.

On 12 January 2021, B’Tselem published a report describing Israel as enacting an apartheid regime:

“The Israeli regime enacts in all the territory it controls (Israeli sovereign territory, East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip) an apartheid regime. One organising principle lies at the base of a wide array of Israeli policies: advancing and perpetuating the supremacy of one group—Jews—over another—Palestinians.

B’Tselem rejects the perception of Israel as a democracy (inside the Green Line) that simultaneously upholds a temporary military occupation (beyond it).”

Over the past year, the state of affairs in Gaza transitioned from full-scale, active warfare toward a highly fragile, contested, and internationally monitored ceasefire framework established following the October 2025 agreement. However, despite this shift in the security paradigm, a severe humanitarian and political crisis continues to grip the territory. The initial agreement laid out a comprehensive framework designed to halt active combat, secure the mutual release of hostages and Palestinian prisoners, scale up humanitarian aid delivery, and oversee the step-by-step withdrawal of Israeli forces to designated lines.

To manage this complex transition, the international community presented the Board of Peace in early 2026, a transitional governing structure created to supervise post-war governance, reconstruction, aid logistics, and security protocols in Gaza. Under this framework, day-to-day civilian administration was designated to be handed over to a non-partisan, technocratic Palestinian committee led by figures such as Dr. Ali Shaath, operating under the international oversight of the Board of Peace and its operational Gaza Executive Board.

In practice, implementation has remained remarkably slow and intensely disputed, defined by deep structural friction on multiple fronts. Regarding governance and oversight, while day-to-day civilian authority is nominally assigned to the Palestinian technocratic committee, questions remain regarding ultimate authority.

Humanitarian conditions also remain at a severe breaking point despite the formal end to widespread offensive operations. Persistent Israeli restrictions on aid entry, delays in physical reconstruction, destroyed sanitation infrastructure, and millions living in inadequate temporary shelters, restricted to one-third of the tiny Gaza Strip and subject to ongoing strikes, continue to fuel a severe civilian emergency.

The broader political response to these arrangements remains sharply divided. Supporters view the Board of Peace as a necessary mechanism for stabilisation, security, and economic reconstruction. Conversely, critics argue that the structure risks bypassing true Palestinian self-determination by concentrating external control over the territory’s future. Ultimately, the past year in Gaza has been marked less by a clear transition to lasting peace than by a fragile ceasefire, unresolved governance questions, continuing humanitarian hardship, and competing visions for control over the region’s future.

The Iran War

On 28 February 2026, the United States and Israel launched Operation Epic Fury against Iran. This joint illegal military campaign targeted Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile facilities, security institutions, and civilian infrastructure and institutions. The opening strikes targeted Iranian leadership, killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and at least five other military commanders and senior officials. The United States launched a strike that hit the Shajareh Tayyebeh primary school in Minab, Hormozgan Province, killing more than 150 people, including approximately 120 schoolchildren; a UN investigation considered it a war crime because the school was a clearly marked civilian institution.

The confrontation rapidly expanded into a global economic crisis centred on the Strait of Hormuz. After the February strikes, Iran declared the strait closed and deployed sea mines, drones, and naval forces. The U.S. Navy then imposed a counter-blockade on commercial vessels bound for Iranian ports. With over 20% of global oil flow halted, oil prices experienced their largest monthly spike in recent history, disrupting global markets for liquefied natural gas, fertiliser, and raw commodities. To bypass Iranian coastal defences, shippers established alternative corridors near Oman. However, maritime brinkmanship persisted, as Iranian forces continued targeting non-compliant commercial tankers and naval assets. Meanwhile, the Saudi East-West 1,200 km oil pipeline that reaches the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea, was reportedly hit by Iraqi Shi‘ite militias’ drones, temporarily halting operations. Saudi Arabia showed restraint toward Iraq, consistent with the GCC countries opting for diplomatic neutrality, and avoiding being dragged into a war waged on behalf of Israel.

Meanwhile, in Iraq, militia strikes against U.S. outposts sparked intense political debates in Baghdad, prompting calls for militia disarmament to prevent direct U.S. retaliation. In Yemen, the Houthis, a key Iranian ally, first targeted Red Sea shipping and Saudi infrastructure. They later seized the key port of Mokha, establishing a second choke point at the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.

Strategically, after the UN-brokered, near five-year de facto ceasefire was shuttered, the Trump administration still refused to use force against the Houthis, even as they controlled the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. This came after their capture of strategic islands and ports, expansion of the territory they control in Yemen, and their attacks on major Saudi cities, including Riyadh.

The war precipitated a severe macroeconomic collapse in Iran. New U.S. sanctions and maritime blockades deepened the collapse. As crude oil exports fell from 2.1 million barrels per day to near zero, state coffers lost roughly $435 million in daily revenue. This decline pushed the Iranian Rial to a record low near 2.3 million per U.S. Dollar (official rate: 42,000 IRR). It also drove annual inflation to 88% and caused prices for staple goods like bread, meat, and dairy to surge. The IMF projects Iran’s GDP to contract by -5.4% to -6.1% in 2026. Total war-related damage is estimated between $50 billion and $144 billion.

Although Pakistani-led mediation produced a Memorandum of Understanding intended to open a path to negotiations, a durable settlement remains elusive. Disputes over nuclear capabilities, sanctions relief, and freedom of navigation remain unresolved, so progress continues to stall. As formal agreements repeatedly break down, the conflict has settled into a war of attrition. Iran’s latest proposed seven-day plan demands that Washington lift its naval blockade of Iranian ports, waive sanctions on Iranian oil sales, release an estimated $12 billion in frozen Iranian assets, and observe a ceasefire covering the region, including Lebanon and Yemen. President Trump rejected the plan and vowed to resume strikes after the midterm elections in November 2026. Since President Trump shifts his position frequently, the strikes might not take place. Even if these strikes do take place, there is no guarantee that the Strait of Hormuz will reopen, nor is there a guarantee that the whole region will not be affected.

Middle East and North Africa

Algeria-Morocco

The rivalry between Algeria and Morocco remains the most entrenched geopolitical fault line in North Africa. Tensions reached a tipping point in August 2021 when Algeria formally severed diplomatic relations with Morocco, closed its airspace to Moroccan aircraft, and halted gas supplies via key regional pipelines. Without direct diplomatic channels and firmly entrenched in opposing global alliances, the two neighbours exist in a state of cold war, driven by unresolved territorial disputes, contrasting foreign policies, energy competition, and a high-stakes battle for influence across the Sahel.

Several structural pillars drive this ongoing dispute. Western Sahara remains the primary flashpoint, with Morocco claiming full sovereignty over the territory through its proposed autonomy plan, while Algeria hosts, arms, and politically backs the pro-independence Polisario Front. Diplomatic momentum has tilted heavily toward Rabat following official backing for its autonomy framework from key international powers, including the United States, France, Spain, Israel, Denmark, and Greece. Morocco’s normalisation of relations with Israel via the Abraham Accords, and the recent official declaration of opening embassies in both countries—accompanied by the United States’ recognition of Moroccan claims over Western Sahara—deepened Algerian strategic anxieties. Algiers views defence and intelligence cooperation between Rabat and Tel Aviv as an explicit national security threat. In contrast, Algeria maintains historical strategic alignment with Russia and non-aligned blocs, whereas Morocco remains anchored to Western nations and Gulf monarchies. Algeria severed its diplomatic relations with the UAE in September 2026, while the UAE kept the door open for resuming diplomatic relations, despite their different positions on several geopolitical issues.

In addition, Rabat and Algiers compete for diplomatic dominance and influence in West Africa. Morocco promotes its Atlantic Initiative to provide landlocked Sahelian states with access to its maritime ports, such as Dakhla; while Algeria relies on military diplomacy, intelligence networks, and legacy mediation frameworks. Nevertheless, its influence faces headwinds following political shifts in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, with the latter’s transitional president, Captain Ibrahim Traore, accepting the credentials of the Israeli Ambassador on 26 June 2026, days before severing all ties with France.

Future relations between Morocco and Algeria are projected to persist as an extended cold war and economic decoupling. It is also projected that direct military conflict will be avoided but closed borders and airspace will remain the norm, with Morocco continuing to leverage international backing to solidify control over Western Sahara, and Algeria maintains support for the Polisario Front to prevent total Moroccan consolidation.

Egypt

Egypt’s political, economic, and regional dynamics reflect a complex and delicate balancing act across multiple strategic fronts. On the macroeconomic level, annual inflation dropped from roughly 24% in early 2025 down towards 11.9% by early 2026, providing crucial price stabilisation for Egyptian households following consecutive rounds of currency devaluation. Governed by its $8 billion Extended Fund Facility with the International Monetary Fund, Cairo managed to reduce the general government debt towards 84% of gross domestic product which is still very high. The government allocated foreign investment capital—including proceeds from major real estate development deals like the $3.5 billion Alam El Roum project with Qatar—directly toward debt payoff, targeting a primary budget surplus of around 4%. Meanwhile, national unemployment remains steady in the range of 6.7% to 7.0%, though structural youth unemployment continues to present long-term challenges.

This economic transformation coincides with a major relocation of state power. In late 2025, the government megaproject was officially designated as The New Capital. State ministries, parliament, and central banking administrative operations completed their functional transition to the new city, effectively shifting the day-to-day administrative seat away from downtown Cairo. The Egyptian Octagon in the New Capital is at least seven times larger than the American Pentagon in terms of floor area.

On the international front, water insecurity remains an acute priority following developments in Ethiopia. Ethiopia finalised the multi-stage filling of the 74-billion-cubic-metre reservoir behind the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and fully commissioned the hydroelectric power generation plant. In the absence of a legally binding tripartite agreement on water allocation during drought years, Cairo escalated its diplomatic posture toward Addis Ababa, maintaining that upstream Nile river flow management is an existential issue for its agricultural sector and freshwater security.

Egypt is also actively navigating security challenges along its immediate borders. In Sudan, Cairo expanded its diplomatic and military coordination with the Sudanese Armed Forces under General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan against the Rapid Support Forces, providing operational intelligence, drone platform support, and logistic coordination hubs along the southern border. Along its western frontier, Egypt maintains active influence over eastern Libya alongside the Libyan National Army led by Khalifa Haftar to secure its border, prevent cross-border militant smuggling, and manage regional migration flows.

The Gaza Strip has been an ongoing national security issue for Egypt which resisted pressure to open the borders for Palestinian refugees in the aftermath of the genocide, decimated infrastructure, and deliberate lack of adequate food and water. It prevented mass permanent population displacement into Egyptian territory while managing humanitarian transit. Israel does not hide its intention to ethnically cleanse the Palestinians under the false claim of “voluntary” immigration.

Finally, Red Sea instability and neighbouring crises continue to exert significant strategic and financial strain. Prolonged maritime security disruptions and Houthi anti-ship missile attacks in the southern Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb forced major global shipping lines to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, causing a sharp drop in Suez Canal transit fees and constraining Egypt’s primary source of foreign currency.

Iraq

Coalition forces leave

Iraq navigates deep political shifts, regional spillover, and ongoing economic challenges. Following late-2025 parliamentary elections, the political alliance known as the Coordination Framework consolidated its authority in parliament. In early 2026, parliament elected Nizar Amidi as President, who subsequently designated Ali al-Zaidi to form the government as Prime Minister. Prime Minister Zaidi pledged to bring non-state armed groups under exclusive state control. Some pro-Iran armed factions made their willingness to disarm conditional on the withdrawal of US forces, while others resisted disarmament or proposed retaining their weapons under alternative arrangements.

The coalition forces completed their departure by the end of September 2026.

Military escalation across the Middle East saw heavy activity by Iran-aligned factions under the umbrella of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, including Kata’ib Hezbollah. These groups launched drone and missile strikes targeting bases hosting United States personnel and strategic regional targets. Operating with high autonomy, armed factions targeted energy infrastructure in the Kurdistan Region and federal security facilities, prompting United States forces to respond with targeted retaliatory strikes against militia command nodes and logistics hubs in central and southern provinces. Additionally, Iraq’s financial sector and maritime shipping routes in the Persian Gulf were increasingly leveraged to move and trade Iranian crude oil, circumventing international sanctions amid broader regional market volatility.

Relations between the federal government in Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government in Erbil remain strained over independent oil exports, budget allocation formulas, and public sector payroll transfers. Due to Erbil’s political alignment with Western security partners, energy infrastructure and airports in the Kurdistan Region faced repeated drone and rocket strikes from southern militias. Internally, the region faces severe structural challenges, as the ruling duopoly between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan has deepened administrative fragmentation, while public discontent grows over delayed civil service salaries and systemic corruption.

Iraq’s broader economic picture remains tied to hydrocarbon reliance, where high oil revenues continue to cover a massive public sector payroll while the country struggles with severe economic diversification deficits, persistent power grid failures, and climate-induced water degradation. Iraq consistently ranks near the bottom of Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index compared to the broader Arab region, lagging far behind Gulf economies like the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, and remaining comparable to conflict-affected states like Syria, Libya, and Yemen. Public oversight evaluations estimate that up to 20% of public procurement funds are lost to systemic corruption, political patronage networks, and illicit capital flight. Prime Minister Zaidi conducted a bold anti-graft campaign, with arrests including a former minister.

The most likely baseline future scenario involves a fragile coexistence, where Iraq remains a sovereign state on paper while armed factions retain heavy representation in parliament, independent armed wings, and lucrative shadow market networks. Structural threat of socio-economic collapse looms over the coming decades, driven by rapid population growth, high youth unemployment, severe Tigris-Euphrates water supply declines, and global energy transitions that threaten to exhaust state reserves and spark widespread civil instability.

Lebanon

Over the past year, Lebanon has remained deeply affected by the devastating fallout of the Israel–Hezbollah conflict. After initial ceasefire efforts, cross-border violence escalated again in 2026, as renewed Israeli airstrikes and ground operations in southern Lebanon prompted retaliatory rocket and drone attacks from Hezbollah. As the warfare continued, massive civilian displacement followed, and negotiations persisted over a US-brokered framework aimed at establishing security arrangements and military withdrawal timelines.

At the centre of Lebanon’s political debate was the state’s monopoly on force—President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam moved to reinforce state sovereignty by expanding the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) south of the Litani River and developing plans to centralise control over non-state weaponry. This objective faced immediate friction as Hezbollah steadfastly rejected disarmament demands prior to a complete Israeli withdrawal. Adding to the uncertainty is the planned drawdown of UNIFIL peacekeeping forces.

Breakthrough diplomatic developments took centre stage through unprecedented US-brokered negotiation rounds held in Washington between Lebanese and Israeli delegations. Starting in mid-April, these talks—led by Lebanese envoy Simon Karam and Israeli officials—focused on formalising a ceasefire and coordinating security mechanisms along the border. These meetings culminated in a landmark June 2026 framework agreement establishing “pilot zones” in southern Lebanon, where Israeli forces began a phased withdrawal as the LAF assumed exclusive territorial control to enforce disarmament and prevent hostilities between the neighbouring states.

As Lebanon’s Prime Minister Nawaf Salam was speaking at the 81st session of the UNGA, calling for an end to the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon and the full enforcement of the ceasefire, Israeli shelling and demolitions continued. Al Jazeera reported on 25 September 2026, “More than 60 towns in southern Lebanon are still occupied by the Israeli army, where the Israelis are carrying out a systematic campaign of demolitions,” and that Israeli forces are “blowing up people’s homes”. Israel occupies 600 sq. km in Lebanon, mostly south of the Litani River.

Amnesty International’s research reveals that more than 10,000 structures were heavily damaged or destroyed between October 2024 and January 2025. Amnesty International stated that “the visual evidence shows that Israeli troops deliberately left a trail of destruction as they moved through southern Lebanon. Among the structures affected are homes, mosques, cemeteries, roads, parks and football pitches.” Amnesty International has previously called for attacks by both Israel and Hezbollah to be investigated as war crimes.

Libya

Over the past year, Libya reached a critical juncture marked by transactional elite collaboration, record energy output, shifting geopolitical alliances, and persistent administrative fragmentation. Libya remains divided between two competing authorities: the UN-recognised Government of National Unity in Tripoli, led by Prime Minister Abdul-Hamid Dbeibah, and the eastern-based Government of National Stability, aligned with Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army and the House of Representatives in Tobruk. Despite this political division, top-down collaboration has emerged between key family scions—specifically Ibrahim Dbeibah, nephew and adviser to Tripoli’s prime minister, and Saddam Haftar, son and military chief of staff to Khalifa Haftar. Mediated by international partners, including the United States, this informal arrangement facilitated the passage of Libya’s first unified national budget in 13 years, totalling 190 billion dinars, or approximately $30 billion. Constitutionally, Libya remains a unified state, yet in political practice this mediated agreement reflects a malfunctioning de facto confederation.

In the hydrocarbon sector—which generates nearly 97% of state revenue—crude production reached a 12-year peak of 1.37 to 1.43 million barrels per day. Both administrations have coordinated to reopen licensing rounds and secure major contracts with international energy companies, including Chevron, Total Energies, and ConocoPhillips. Despite this surge in oil production, Libya suffers from chronic power outages, leaving the eastern region’s electricity reliant on a power grid from Egypt. Furthermore, increased oil revenues have not alleviated domestic economic hardship. Dinar devaluations by the Central Bank of Libya have driven up import costs and inflation, while a significant portion of state-subsidised fuel imports continue to be diverted into elite-managed smuggling networks.

Foreign influence continues to dictate Libya’s strategic trajectory. In a major diplomatic realignment, Saddam Haftar visited Ankara for formal talks with Turkish defence officials. This shift allows the Haftar family to seek broader political legitimacy, military cooperation, reconstruction contracts, and diplomatic leverage against Russia, while enabling Türkiye to secure its 2019 maritime boundary agreement and commercial interests in eastern Libya. At the same time, United States policy focuses on promoting fiscal transparency, energy reliability, and counterbalancing Russia’s military presence via the Africa Corps, formerly known as the Wagner Group. Concurrently, the European Union prioritises border security and migration management, maintaining technical engagement with eastern authorities alongside naval initiatives like EUNAVFOR MED Irini.

Libya’s most probable medium-term outcome is ongoing de facto dual rule, where rival factions co-manage public funds and oil revenue allocations while preserving separate territorial control and postponing national elections. Less likely scenarios include United Nations-brokered institutional unification, renewed nationwide military conflict, systemic economic collapse, or formal territorial partition.

Qatar

Qatar pursued its Third National Development Strategy over the past year, balancing ambitious growth targets with geopolitical risks stemming from regional instability. The fallout from regional conflict includes severe damage to Qatar’s Ras Laffan complex, where two of the 14 liquefied natural gas production trains and one gas-to-liquids facility were severely damaged. Consequently, Qatar Energy declared force majeure on long-term contracts with buyers in countries including Italy, Belgium, South Korea, and China. Repairs are expected to take three years at an estimated cost of $26 billion, with annual lost revenue near $20 billion. Amid these challenges, Qatar, along with Pakistan, continues to mediate between Iran and the United States.

Despite these disruptions, Qatar maintained economic growth and cultural momentum. Qatar Energy advanced its North Field East project—the world’s largest liquefied natural gas expansion—securing multiple 20-plus-year supply contracts toward its goal of 142 million tonnes per annum. Backed by Invest Qatar initiatives, the state expanded non-hydrocarbon growth across digital infrastructure, transport, and education, maintaining a non-oil sector share of over 65% of gross domestic product. Building on post-World Cup momentum, annual visitors exceeded multi-million milestones, supported by cruise tourism, Formula 1, and preparations for the 2027 FIBA Basketball World Cup.

Lacking alternative export pipelines, Qatar remains dependent on the Strait of Hormuz for maritime liquefied natural gas shipments and regional airspace availability for Qatar Airways operations. With a high reliance on maritime food imports and coastal desalination facilities for municipal water, regional maritime instability presents persistent risks to supply chain continuity.

Hosting Al Udeid Air Base, where Pentagon and USCENTCOM officials are weighing options not to fully rebuild damaged fixed assets in their original state across Gulf Cooperation Council countries, underscores Qatar’s strategic defence ties. At the same time, maintaining a neutral mediating role through ceasefire, hostage, and humanitarian talks highlights Qatar’s continuous balancing act between strategic defence alliances, regional diplomacy, and mediation.

Saudi Arabia

Despite maintaining official neutrality during broader regional conflicts with Iran, Saudi Arabia experienced significant economic and security pressures from maritime disruptions in both the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. To mitigate energy export bottlenecks, the Kingdom halted Gulf exports out of Ras Tanura and rerouted crude through its East-West Pipeline to Red Sea terminals in Yanbu. However, Iraqi Shi‘ite militias struck the 1,200-kilometre pipeline, causing a temporary shutdown. Concurrently, a renewed frontline escalation by Houthi forces in Yemen—marked by the capture of coastal strongholds such as Mokha and Mayyun Island, pushing militarily and expanding inland, declaring naval blockade in the Red Sea, and cross-border missile and drone strikes against Saudi infrastructure including Riyadh—prompted direct coalition airstrikes.

In response to these regional war shocks, Riyadh adapted both its security posture and domestic development agenda. On 7 August 2026, Saudi Arabia signed the Makkah Pact, also known as the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, alongside Türkiye and Pakistan to establish a mutual defence framework, though its partners kept active troop deployments in reserve during initial Houthi cross-border attacks. Additionally, Saudi Arabia and 13 other Arab and Islamic countries announced the creation of a maritime military coalition to safeguard freedom of navigation through the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden. This dual maritime chokepoint squeeze, with Iran disrupting the Strait of Hormuz and Houthi control affecting Bab al-Mandeb, created a secondary naval bottleneck that choked global trade, spiked maritime insurance, and pushed crude oil prices past the $100-per-barrel threshold.

Strained state revenues and oil export disruptions ultimately led to a pragmatic reset of Vision 2030, with capital shifted away from mega-projects like NEOM’s The Line and redirected toward infrastructure resilience, renewable energy grid integration, housing, mining, and localising 50% of military procurement. Long-term projections now centre on fiscal discipline and structural diversification, supported by non-oil activity rising above 52% of gross domestic product, falling national unemployment, and female workforce participation surpassing 33%.

Sudan

The civil war between General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has settled into a bloody, entrenched impasse. Defined by major geographic shifts, human rights atrocities, and complex foreign interventions, the conflict has effectively partitioned Sudan geographically, politically, and ethnically.

The past year has solidified a clear territorial split across the country. In a significant tactical turning point, the SAF recaptured key areas of Omdurman, Bahri, and Central Khartoum, including the presidential palace, airport, and military headquarters, which allowed the SAF-aligned administration under Prime Minister Kamil Idris to re-establish a functional government presence in the national capital. Conversely, the RSF expanded its dominance in western Sudan. Following an 18-month siege, the paramilitary force captured Al-Fasher in late 2025 and advanced into Kordofan, seizing critical infrastructure including the Heglig oil field. At the same time, conflict around key hubs like El Obeid and Kadugli has devolved into long-range drone strikes and heavy artillery bombardments targeting markets, logistics nodes, and civilian infrastructure. Sustained by gold mining, local taxation, looting, and mobile tactics, the RSF maintains the capability to conduct a prolonged asymmetrical campaign despite lacking the political legitimacy to govern eastern Sudan.

Both warring parties have committed widespread violations of international law. The SAF has conducted unguided aerial bombardments on urban centres, engaged in arbitrary detentions, and obstructed humanitarian access. However, international investigators highlight that RSF abuses are systemic. The RSF and its allied Arab militias have carried out ethnic cleansing and massacres against non-Arab groups, particularly the Masalit, in Darfur, used widespread sexual violence as a weapon of war, and systematically destroyed critical healthcare and water infrastructure.

This violence has triggered the world’s largest displacement crisis, with over 14 million people fleeing their homes, including 9 million internally displaced and more than 4 million refugees entering Chad, Egypt, and South Sudan. Compounded by deliberate aid blockades and agricultural collapse, severe famine now grips broad areas of Darfur and South Kordofan. The acute food crisis has escalated into the world’s largest humanitarian emergency, leaving nearly 19.5 million people facing severe hunger, including 825,000 children suffering from severe acute malnutrition and 135,000 people trapped in catastrophic, famine-like Phase 5 conditions. Responsibility for this widespread starvation falls primarily on the warring military factions, whose ongoing conflict since 2023 has deliberately weaponised food by blocking aid convoys, destroying local markets, and displacing millions of farmers. This human-made catastrophe is further aggravated by a severe international funding collapse, leaving emergency operations like the World Food Programme (WFP) facing hundreds of millions of dollars in shortfalls and unable to safely reach the hardest-hit areas.

Both the SAF and the RSF continue to use starvation as a deliberate tactic of war by systematically choking off life-saving humanitarian access. The RSF has maintained an 18-month chokehold around the regional capital of Al-Fasher and its surrounding access roads, where paramilitary checkpoints routinely harass, rob, and detain drivers while food supplies are routinely intercepted or looted. Operating from Port Sudan, the SAF-led government has severely restricted cross-border aid clearances through regulatory blockades, delayed visas, and denied permissions that prevent international non-governmental organisations and United Nations agencies from transporting food from neighbouring Chad into rebel-held territories. Furthermore, humanitarian operations have faced direct attacks on medical and logistics assets, routine looting of warehouses, and arbitrary detention or execution of aid workers by both warring factions.

Sudan is now divided between two competing administrative entities: the SAF-aligned Government of Hope based in Port Sudan and Khartoum, and the RSF’s Government of Peace and Unity in Nyala. External actors actively shape the trajectory of this conflict. Egypt serves as the SAF’s primary regional partner to prevent border spillover, maintain Nile water security, and contain militia expansion along its southern border, leading political forums for Sudanese civilians while maintaining military ties with Burhan. The United Arab Emirates has been accused by United Nations experts of supplying heavy weapons and logistical backing to the RSF via routes in Chad and Libya to secure commercial interests in Sudan’s gold reserves, agricultural land, and Red Sea access. Saudi Arabia operates as a mediator balancing relations with both sides, co-sponsoring the Jeddah Talks alongside the United States to secure localised ceasefires and protect Red Sea maritime routes. Meanwhile, multilateral bodies including the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the United Nations, and the European Union are working within a framework that suspended Sudan’s African Union membership, pushed for an inclusive civilian transition roadmap, expanded targeted sanctions against commanders, and implemented bans on the Sudanese gold trade to restrict conflict financing.

Although broader geopolitical friction has constrained foreign aid pipelines by disrupting supply routes to the RSF and limiting drone shipments to the SAF, both warring factions receive support from Arab countries, and retain sufficient revenue and arms to perpetuate the war. A protracted conflict in Sudan will most likely lead to a de facto partition similar to the Libyan scenario, where the SAF consolidates control over eastern and central regions while the RSF retains Darfur and parts of Kordofan, leaving competing parallel quasi-governments to fund localised war economies amid low-intensity drone warfare and skirmishes.

Syria

Following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in late 2024, Syria entered a transitional phase led by interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa. Over the past 12 to 18 months, the nation has pursued international re-engagement alongside macroeconomic stabilisation, while grappling with deep domestic security frictions, unresolved territorial enclaves, and borderland militarisation.

The central government in Damascus moved to formalise its administrative authority through an interim constitutional declaration and the formation of a 210-seat People’s Assembly. Between October 2025 and May 2026, 140 members were selected via local electoral colleges, with President Sharaa appointing the final 70 lawmakers in July 2026. Despite these steps, power remains heavily concentrated within the executive branch. A major milestone in centralising state authority occurred on 25 August 2026, when SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi formally announced the dissolution of the Syrian Democratic Forces as an independent military body. Originally formed in October 2015 as the primary United States ground ally against ISIS and defence force for north-eastern Syria, the Syrian Democratic Forces long held one-third of the country, including major energy reserves and detainee facilities like al-Hol. Building on agreements initiated in early 2026, Syrian Democratic Forces units, administrative bodies, border posts, and oil fields were phased into central state defence and interior ministries in exchange for guaranteed Kurdish cultural, linguistic, and civil rights.

Conversely, the Druze-majority province of Suwayda in southern Syria remains a primary holdout against central integration. Local resistance prevented the holding of Electoral College elections in Suwayda, leading President Sharaa to appoint two representatives directly to fill the province’s seats. Governed by local civic and spiritual councils alongside armed factions such as Rijal al-Karama, Suwayda refuses to disband its local security apparatus without constitutional guarantees for federalism or municipal policing control. This resistance is reinforced by informal Israeli deterrence against Damascus military movements in southern Syria, though Suwayda faces potential economic isolation from state reconstruction funds. Meanwhile, internal peace remains fragile nationwide. Early vigilante retaliations against Alawite civilians along the coast, alongside clashes between Bedouin communities and Druze groups, highlight the central government’s ongoing challenge to restrain state-aligned militias and preserve inter-communal security.

Damascus executed a swift foreign policy shift that enabled extensive Western and regional re-engagement. The United Nations and the United Kingdom eased key terror designations against President Sharaa, and on 24 August 2026, the United States officially removed Syria from its State Sponsors of Terrorism list. In addition, the transitional government terminated Russia’s long-term naval base lease in Tartus, returning the strategic port to full national control. Broad diplomatic outreach across Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar led major Gulf conglomerates, such as DP World, to commit capital toward redeveloping Syrian ports, energy grids, and trade infrastructure. These efforts helped expand Syria’s estimated gross domestic product from $20 billion in 2024 to $32 billion in 2025, with projections targeting $50 billion. The Damascus Securities Exchange reopened, and international financial institutions relaxed restrictions on the central bank to encourage foreign direct investment.

Despite macroeconomic progress, everyday citizens face acute cost-of-living pressure. Supply disruptions prompted 30% to 40% government price hikes on gasoline and diesel, sparking localised protests across multiple governorates. On human rights, the government established the Transitional Justice Commission and the National Commission for the Missing, allowing international bodies access to investigate past regime atrocities. However, human rights organisations emphasise that these commissions largely overlook recent abuses committed by newly integrated state-aligned forces.

In south-western Syria, security dynamics are heavily shaped by the situation surrounding the Golan Heights, a 1,200-square-kilometre plateau occupied by Israel since 1967 and unilaterally annexed under its 1981 Golan Heights Law. Following the collapse of the Assad regime, Israeli forces declared the 1974 United Nations Disengagement Agreement defunct and advanced past the UNDOF-monitored Alpha Line buffer zone. The Israel Defence Forces occupy 800 square kilometres of Syrian territory and expanded their physical footprint into parts of Quneitra and western Daraa, securing strategic high ground on Jabal al-Sheikh and establishing military outposts, drawing formal condemnation from Damascus and the United Nations for sovereignty violations.

Syria’s long-term trajectory involves pragmatic realpolitik and economic recovery, where executive power remains centralised under the interim constitution while lifting sanctions enables sustained Gulf and Turkish investment, leading regional enclaves to gradually accept central authority in exchange for municipal autonomy. In the light of the closure of the Straits of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb, Syria could become the land bridge and host to oil pipeline and trade route between many GCC countries and the Syrian ports on the Mediterranean.

Türkiye

Located at a critical juncture bridging Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Black Sea basin, Türkiye operates under a doctrine of strategic autonomy. Under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Ankara balances alliances across competing global power blocs while expanding its sovereign defence, industrial, and diplomatic footprint.

In domestic politics and governance, executive centralisation remains pronounced under the presidential system introduced in 2018, with President Erdoğan retaining central authority over foreign policy, defence procurement, and state administration. Following major municipal election losses for the ruling AKP in 2024, the state intensified administrative and legal pressure against opposition parties.

Prosecutors opened a probe ex officio investigating former PM Ahmet Davutoğlu who served as Türkiye’s foreign minister (2009–2014) and prime minister (2014–2016) under Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) before falling out with the president and resigning. The investigation stems from a resurfaced video originally recorded five years ago where Davutoğlu criticised government corruption, alleged that officials enriched their relatives, and claimed Türkiye was handed over to “five contractors”. Davutoğlu appeared before prosecutors to testify on 7 September 2026, stating afterward that he respects the judiciary. Ahmet Davutoğlu was the architect of Türkiye’s foreign policy, especially in the Arab world. He is a profound political theorist and strategist, and the probe is an attack on free expression.

Regarding economic realities and disinflation strategy, Treasury and Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek and the Central Bank continue implementing orthodox monetary tightening policies, maintaining high benchmark interest rates to combat inflation triggered by previous low-rate economic models. Although official annual inflation slowed to approximately 31.5% by mid-2026, independent research groups such as ENAG estimate figures remaining substantially higher due to elevated energy, housing, and food costs. Austerity policies and suppressed real minimum wage growth continue to impact household purchasing power, delaying single-digit inflation goals into subsequent years. The World Bank expects inflation in 2026 to decline to around 28.3% by year-end.

In its multidirectional foreign policy and defence posture, Türkiye maintains its core position as NATO’s second-largest standing military while actively pursuing pragmatic ties with non-Western blocs, including a formal bid for BRICS membership, deep economic cooperation with Russia, and broader diplomatic outreach across the Global South. Ankara projects global power through an expanding defence industry, producing Bayraktar uncrewed systems, indigenous fighter platforms like KAAN, and naval combatants, with defence export deals spanning Europe, Africa, and Central Asia. In terms of regional security, Ankara maintains a permanent military buffer zone along its southern border against Kurdish YPG/PKK forces while actively shaping political transition and security arrangements in post-Assad Syria. In the Black Sea, Türkiye acts as a key diplomatic mediator between Kyiv and Moscow while maintaining strict regulatory oversight of Turkish Straits maritime traffic under the Montreux Convention. Meanwhile, in the Eastern Mediterranean, it pursues the Mavi Vatan or Blue Homeland doctrine to project naval influence and secure sovereign claims over offshore natural gas corridors and exclusive economic zones.

Türkiye faces ongoing counter-insurgency operations in northern Syria and Iraq, Israeli incursions and occupation in Lebanon and Syria, and Israeli right-wing leaders including former PM Naftali Bennett who called Türkiye the “New Iran”, which in Israeli politics is tantamount to a call for war.

Yemen

The capture of Mayyun Island, also known as Perim Island, alongside the nearby historic port city of Mokha by Houthi forces marks a major strategic shift in both the broader Middle East conflict and Yemen’s domestic landscape. Mayyun sits directly inside the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, a narrow 18-mile-wide channel through which roughly 12% of global seaborne trade and millions of barrels of oil pass daily.

This geographical position enables direct control over the maritime chokepoint. Controlling Mayyun Island allows the Houthis to station short-range anti-ship missiles, coastal radar, and artillery directly inside the narrowest point of the waterway, significantly reducing their reliance on long-range ballistic missiles and drones to target maritime traffic. Furthermore, the rapid collapse and retreat of the government-aligned National Resistance Forces led by Tareq Saleh dismantled the primary land-based buffer securing the southern Red Sea, as Mayyun Island and Mokha previously served as vital operational bases to monitor maritime activity, and protect regional shipping lanes.

The economic and energy implications of this offensive ripple globally. Occurring alongside simultaneous maritime and drone disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, Houthi control of the Bab al-Mandeb exerts severe pressure on global energy flows. Although Saudi Arabia had increasingly relied on Red Sea ports and the East-West Pipeline to bypass shipping risks in the Gulf, Houthi forces adopted an escalation-for-escalation strategy, actively threatening Saudi oil tankers, infrastructure, and commercial vessels while declaring navigation safe for unaligned shipping. Consequently, spiking maritime insurance premiums and rerouting expenses around the Cape of Good Hope continue to prolong global supply chain delays and inflate global freight costs.

American officials met with Houthi leaders in Oman in September 2026, and the Houthis agreed not to attack US warships and tankers in exchange for the United States not attacking the Houthis, similar to the May 2025 ceasefire. This explains President Trump’s refusal to attack the Houthis when, on 10 September 2026, Saudi Arabia requested direct American military strikes against Houthi forces in Yemen—a request that President Trump declined. The agreement between the Houthis and the United States has been reported to include a commitment not to attack Israeli ships, which the Houthis denied.

Regionally, the coastal advance shattered the fragile stalemate held since 2022, reigniting heavy frontline combat across Taiz and Hodeidah governorates. Houthi forces declared a siege-for-siege blockade in July 2026, targeting crude tankers and energy infrastructure in Yanbu, Jizan, and southern Saudi facilities. By 10 September 2026, the Houthi offensive secured Mokha, Mayyun Island, and the Hanish archipelago, solidifying physical control over Bab al-Mandeb. Resumed Houthi ballistic missile and drone strikes targeting southern Saudi cities like Abha, Jizan, and Najran prompted retaliatory Saudi-led coalition air raids across Sanaa, Hodeidah, and Red Sea coastal positions. Aligning with Iran in the broader regional context, but joining late, Houthi forces also maintained long-range missile and drone attacks targeting maritime routes.

The renewed fighting coincides with significant political shifts within the Yemeni government and the collapse of diplomacy. Following a rollback of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) expansionism across eastern governorates, STC Chairman Aidarus al-Zoubaidi saw his influence wane. Presidential Leadership Council Chairman Rashad al-Alimi issued a decree in January 2026 appointing Foreign Minister Shaya Mohsin Zindani as Prime Minister to head a reorganised cabinet following the resignation of Salem bin Buriek. Meanwhile, direct bilateral negotiations between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis stalled over Presidential Leadership Council exclusion, revenue distribution debates, and international backlash against Red Sea shipping attacks, before completely dissolving amid the 2026 cross-border strikes.

Ongoing military actions continue to degrade domestic infrastructure, civil transport, and aid distribution. Because the Houthis do not operate an independent civil aviation authority, civil aviation legally remains under the Aden-based Presidential Leadership Council authority, with Sanaa International Airport relying on Yemen for limited, intermittent flights. Yemen operates a commercial fleet of just ten active airframes constrained by historical wartime destruction, airspace restrictions, and periodic Houthi seizures of aircraft landing in Sanaa. On the humanitarian front, the World Food Programme suspended general food assistance across Houthi-controlled northern territories in December 2023. The late 2026 combat around Taiz and Hodeidah displaced tens of thousands of additional households, deepening systemic food insecurity.

Yemen’s future remains heavily constrained by basic survival demands and its strategic positioning along the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. There is a very strong presence of tribalism, which could translate into taking sides as tribes, with the possibility of warlords challenging central authorities. The Houthis are on the offensive, and it is unlikely that they will give up power. If the balance of power continues to be in their favour, the most likely scenario is formal partition, wherein the Houthis consolidate a militarised state across the densely populated northern highlands and Red Sea coast, while the Presidential Leadership Council governs the oil-rich southern and eastern governorates.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa has emerged as the global epicentre of violent jihadist activity, shaping the security landscape for over 370 million Muslims, roughly a third of the region’s total population. As militant groups expand across rural hinterlands, global powers are manoeuvring through competing strategic, economic, and security initiatives.

Foreign engagement across the continent has undergone a major structural transformation. As Western militaries withdraw from Niger and the broader Sahel, Washington has shifted from expansive bases toward intelligence-sharing, drone partnerships, trade frameworks like the African Growth and Opportunity Act, and health programmes like the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief. Geopolitically, the United States focuses on securing transition minerals such as lithium, cobalt, and rare earth minerals to counter Chinese and Russian influence, highlighted by infrastructure initiatives like the Lobito Corridor connecting the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia to the Atlantic. Concurrently, France’s historic security presence collapsed following military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, ending operations like Barkhane. European nations have pivoted toward bilateral economic deals, green energy initiatives in solar and hydrogen, and funding border security in North and West Africa to manage Mediterranean migration, alongside the European Union’s Global Gateway infrastructure plan countering Chinese state-backed loans across East and Southern Africa. Meanwhile, Moscow reorganised the Wagner Group into the state-controlled Africa Corps under the Ministry of Defence, deploying expeditionary forces to Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and the Central African Republic to trade regime survival, counterinsurgency assistance, and diplomatic protection for lucrative gold, diamond, and uranium concessions.

Highlighting rare earth minerals and mining concessions can obscure the severe economic realities faced by the region, which accounts for 67% of global extreme poverty despite representing 16% of the world’s population. Over 53 million people face severe deprivations in health, education, and living standards, while 390 million lack safe drinking water according to UNICEF Africa. Addressing these dire conditions—for which former European colonisers bear responsibility—is essential, as paying North African nations to curb border crossings cannot stop illegal migration to Europe without resolving these root causes.

Militant activity across key regional theatres is driven by several primary coalitions. Jama‘at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin operates as the dominant Al-Qaeda affiliate in the Sahel, expanding from rural Mali and Burkina Faso toward coastal West Africa, where it has intensified pressure around Bamako and Ouagadougou and launched cross-border raids into northern Ghana, Togo, Benin, and Ivory Coast. In the Lake Chad Basin across Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, and Islamic State West Africa Province, Boko Haram continuously targets state militaries and rural infrastructure. In East Africa, Al-Shabaab maintains shadow governance across southern Somalia while targeting urban centres and transit hubs, recently regaining rural districts as counter-insurgency operations stall. In Central and Southern Africa, the Islamic State Central Africa Province works alongside the Allied Democratic Forces predominantly in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province.

Instability continues to escalate within these zones. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights reported the execution of dozens of surrendering Malian soldiers in Gao by Jama‘at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin and Tuareg-led Azawad Liberation Front forces. Juntas in the Alliance of Sahel States relying on Russia’s Africa Corps face operational fatigue, setbacks, and rising civilian casualties, with Amnesty International reporting that Malian armed forces and Wagner personnel committed war crimes including murder and torture during joint operations. Concurrently, the Sudanese civil war has opened weapons-smuggling corridors across Central and West Africa, while governance vacuums, a lack of basic state services, and severe climate conditions exacerbating land and water competition provide fertile ground for ongoing conflict and extremism.

Nigeria

President Bola Tinubu is pursuing fiscal stabilisation and economic diversification. Core measures include ending the petrol subsidy, unifying the foreign-exchange market, and consolidating taxes under the Nigeria Tax Act. While these reforms seek to reduce market distortions and strengthen domestic production, they have also heightened short-term household pressures. Specifically, the removal of fuel subsidies and the floating of the Naira have triggered severe inflation hovering near 34.8%. Consequently, national poverty rates remain high at approximately 56%, which has widened regional and social divides, exacerbated food insecurity, and limited equitable access to basic healthcare and education.

The government simultaneously faces banditry, jihadist violence in the northeast, separatist activity, and public resistance to economic adjustment. In response, it has introduced anticorruption measures and a National Single Window to simplify trade and reduce administrative leakage. Exchange-rate stabilisation and improved sovereign credit assessments may support policy continuity, although inflation and the cost of living remain significant risks.

Widespread violence persists across the country, including Boko Haram and ISWAP terrorism in the northeast, violent banditry and mass kidnappings in the northwest, farmer-herder clashes in the Middle Belt, and separatist agitation in the southeast. Kidnapping has morphed into a multi-billion-naira illicit enterprise that severely damages agriculture, paralyses rural transport, and forces families into financial ruin. Both Muslim and Christian communities suffer from criminal violence and terrorism. For instance, most of the girls in the famous 2014 Chibok kidnapping in Borno State were a mixture of Christians and Muslims, whereas kidnappings of girls in south-eastern Niger, around Diffa, affect a roughly 99% Muslim community.

Recent United Nations findings highlight a severe human rights and humanitarian crisis in Nigeria, marked by widespread mass abductions and systematic violence. According to the OHCHR, at least 402 people—predominantly schoolchildren—were kidnapped across Niger, Kebbi, Kwara, and Borno states in a single wave, with only 88 individuals managing to escape or regain freedom. UN Independent Experts have raised grave alarms over targeted violations by groups such as Boko Haram and ISWAP against Christian and religious minority women and girls in northern Nigeria and the Middle Belt, including abductions. Furthermore, a CEDAW inquiry report underscores that child abductions have continued unabated since the 2014 Chibok kidnapping, with dozens of the original victims still missing alongside persistent failures to provide reparations, reintegration support, or protection for survivors. Exacerbating this situation, the World Food Programme (WFP) notes that escalating attacks on rural farming communities have driven nearly 35 million Nigerians toward severe food insecurity across Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states. In response, UN officials and experts urge Nigerian authorities to take immediate, lawful action to halt abductions, rescue remaining captives, dismantle systemic impunity, protect IDP camps, and reform local security and justice responses.

On the economic front, GDP growth reached 4.4%, supported by stronger oil and non-oil activity, with non-oil exports exceeding $6 billion. Resources formerly used for fuel subsidies are being redirected toward infrastructure, employment, and production-focused poverty alleviation programmes. Future outcomes will depend on effective implementation, inflation control, and whether benefits successfully reach vulnerable households.

Internationally, Nigeria uses its BRICS partnership to advocate for wider Global South representation and the reform of international financial institutions. It simultaneously maintains important security and trade ties with Europe and the United States, though President Trump continues to misrepresent the security situation in Nigeria. Within ECOWAS, Abuja seeks deeper integration, renewed trust following recent divisions in the Sahel, and regionally led security responses.

Asia

Bangladesh

Following the August 2024 uprising that ended former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s 15-year administration, Bangladesh underwent political restructuring, economic realignment, and institutional reform under an interim administration led by Chief Adviser Dr Muhammad Yunus alongside Head of State President Mohammed Shahabuddin. The interim government operated under four key imperatives: restoring public order and civil authority following the crisis; advancing constitutional and legal reforms; pursuing accountability for past abuses; and managing state affairs to ensure a clean democratic transition back to an elected parliament.

In mid-November 2025, Bangladesh’s International Crimes Tribunal sentenced ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to death in absentia for crimes against humanity linked to lethal force used against civilian protesters during the July–August 2024 unrest. To curb executive overreach and expand parliamentary oversight, the interim leadership drafted the constitutional reform proposals of the July Charter, which voters endorsed in a national referendum. On 12 February 2026, Bangladesh held national parliamentary elections, where the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, led by Tarique Rahman, won a two-thirds majority. This victory returned the party to power and concluded the interim mandate as Tarique Rahman assumed office as Prime Minister.

On the macroeconomic front, gross domestic product growth stabilised around 4.0% amid high-single-digit inflation, with steady diaspora remittance inflows and foreign exchange stabilisation providing essential external relief. The FY2025–26 budget incorporated austerity measures to curb public debt servicing costs, while state banking regulators underwent leadership restructuring to address non-performing loans and capital flight. Although Ready-Made Garment exports faced intense regional competition, key international market access agreements and tariff adjustments helped preserve baseline export revenues.

Critical progress also continued across infrastructure and energy development. The Bangladeshi government and the World Bank signed agreements financing the Bay Terminal Marine Infrastructure Development Project in Chittagong to expand deep-water port capacity. Preparations advanced for the trial run and grid integration of the Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant, aimed at improving base-load reliability and reducing dependence on imported liquid fuel. However, logistics and aviation supply chains experienced temporary operational delays following a major fire at the freight facility of Hazrat Shahjalal International Airport in Dhaka.

Social, defence, and regional dynamics presented ongoing challenges. Instability in Myanmar’s Rakhine State sustained security pressure along the Cox’s Bazar border, while domestic security forces maintained operations targeting insurgent groups in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Government commissions initiated probes into past cases of enforced disappearances, administrative corruption, and violence associated with the 2024 uprising, monitored closely by civil society organisations emphasising fair trial standards. Simultaneously, climate adaptation policies gained priority as Bangladesh approached graduation from Least Developed Country status, shifting its eligibility for multilateral concessionary finance.

The situation is further complicated by the persistent Rohingya humanitarian crisis. The Rohingya, a predominantly Muslim ethnic minority native to Rakhine State, were stripped of citizenship rights under Myanmar’s 1982 Citizenship Law, leading to pervasive statelessness and severe restrictions on basic liberties. Following a 2017 military crackdown in Myanmar, over 700,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh. Today, Bangladesh hosts approximately 1.2 million refugees, primarily in crowded camps across Cox’s Bazar, with a smaller population relocated to Bhasan Char island. Decreasing international aid through the United Nations Joint Response Plan has constrained basic food and medical provisions, while the camps face seasonal flooding, fire risks, and security threats from gangs. Stalled repatriation efforts have driven thousands to attempt hazardous sea crossings across the Bay of Bengal toward Southeast Asia. Internationally, Myanmar faces genocide proceedings at the International Court of Justice alongside ongoing investigations at the International Criminal Court.

Indonesia

President Prabowo Subianto is advancing the Golden Indonesia Vision 2045, a national strategy prioritising industrial development, education, and food, energy, and water security. Major initiatives include the Free Nutritious Meals programme and Danantara, a state holding entity tasked with coordinating strategic assets, infrastructure, and housing investments.

Internal politics have also shifted under Prabowo, who has reshaped the Red and White Cabinet by appointing career officials and specialists to several key posts. His administration has strengthened the security apparatus to address territorial tensions—particularly in Papua—while maintaining a broad political coalition ahead of the 2029 election cycle.

Economically, annual GDP growth is estimated at 5.2%, anchored by downstream processing policies that require nickel, bauxite, and copper to be refined domestically rather than exported as raw ore. Public spending and infrastructure investments aim to reduce poverty (currently reported at 8.5%) and transition workers from informal jobs into higher-skilled occupations. While these initiatives support long-term productivity, they also raise fiscal deficits and debt-service demands. Although the full-year annual deficit is expected to reach 2.85% of GDP—remaining below the statutory legal cap of 3.0%—rising deficit pressures could still trigger budget cuts in education and healthcare, where rural areas are already at a disadvantage.

External economic challenges have further strained domestic stability. In June 2026, the Indonesian Rupiah fell to a record low of 18,028 per US dollar, driven by surging crude oil prices tied to Gulf hostilities during the US-Israel war on Iran. As a net oil importer, Indonesia saw its trade surplus collapse from $3.3 billion to $89 million in April, causing dollar demand to surge while supply shrank. Regional economic uncertainty is further compounded by proposed US import tariffs stemming from forced labour allegations.

On the environmental front, Indonesia holds the world’s third-largest tropical rainforest area, behind only the Amazon and Congo basins. However, agricultural expansion, including palm oil production, has relied heavily on deforestation and open burning. Haze from Indonesian forest and peatland fires has regularly forced school closures across several states in neighbouring Malaysia, with air quality impacts extending to Singapore and the Philippines.

In foreign policy, Indonesia balances BRICS membership with defence cooperation with the United States, commercial ties with Europe, and leadership within ASEAN. This strategy seeks greater influence for the Global South without compromising traditional Western partnerships. Regionally, Indonesia prioritises maritime logistics, small-business integration, and building more resilient supply chains.

Malaysia

Under Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, Malaysia is pursuing economic and social reform through the Malaysia Madani (“Civilised Malaysia”) framework. Launched in 2024 as an 11-year plan, it combines technology-driven growth with targeted welfare assistance. While Madani serves as the overarching national ideology, the PuTERA35 roadmap specifically aims to advance Bumiputera economic participation while shifting portions of the social safety net toward needs-based eligibility. This builds upon Malaysia’s affirmative action history: following the violent 1969 racial riots in Kuala Lumpur between ethnic Malays and ethnic Chinese, the government introduced the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1971. The decades-old framework was designed to elevate the economic standing and wealth share of the indigenous Bumiputera (“Sons of the Soil”). By navigating these reforms, Anwar addresses a sensitive topic in Malaysian politics—balancing historical affirmative action with broader economic modernisation without destabilising ethnic harmony.

Politically, Anwar leads a multi-ethnic Unity Government facing persistent pressure from conservative Islamic parties like PAS and Malay-nationalist opponents. His administration has prioritised anticorruption initiatives and proposed a two-term limit for prime ministers. Despite intense political competition, the civil service and state institutions offer structural continuity leading into the 2028 federal election cycle. Anwar’s political trajectory informs his current approach: originally the second leader of the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM), he was recruited into UMNO by Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad in 1982 before his high-profile ouster in 1998, after which he founded the People’s Justice Party (PKR). Today, his alignment with former political rivals remains pragmatic.

Economically, annual GDP growth is projected at 4.3%–5.5% over the next decade, fuelled by investments in AI data centres, renewable energy, and semiconductor manufacturing. To manage public finances and address living costs, the government is replacing broad subsidies with income-targeted assistance to alleviate extreme poverty. Concurrently, PuTERA35 targets 30% Bumiputera equity ownership and 70% skilled employment representation.

In foreign policy, Malaysia balances relationships with major global powers while utilising ASEAN and its BRICS partnership to advocate for a multipolar order and resist supply-chain fragmentation. However, domestic immigration policies continue to draw international scrutiny. Reports concerning the repatriation of nearly 1,500 detained Myanmar nationals (out of 5,000) raised concerns from the UNHCR and civil-society groups regarding voluntary return and non-return principles, though the Malaysian government maintains that no Rohingya were forcibly returned. Additionally, the new Digital Passenger Processing (DPP) biometric system shifts refugee registration and status management under direct state oversight. Because Malaysia is not a signatory to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol, unauthorised entry and stay remain criminalised under domestic law. As documented by organisations like the Global Detention Project, this framework enables an immigration detention system that holds thousands of undocumented migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees in depots and prisons without fixed time limits.

Pakistan

Over the past year, Pakistan has navigated an intricate set of economic stabilisation challenges, regional security pressures, and major-power diplomatic balancing acts. On the economic front, headline consumer price inflation cooled down toward 7.1% to 7.2%, providing substantial relief from previous historical peaks. Following programme reviews under the Extended Fund Facility and the Resilience and Sustainability Facility, the International Monetary Fund approved disbursements totalling over $3.3 billion to strengthen central bank foreign exchange reserves and support external debt obligations. Meanwhile, real gross domestic product growth stabilised in the 3.2% to 3.7% range, anchored by steady agricultural output, services, and a moderate recovery in Large-Scale Manufacturing, particularly within the construction materials and automotive sectors. Additionally, overseas worker remittances surged past $30 to $40 billion, remaining a fundamental pillar supporting the current account.

In its regional and Middle Eastern relations, Pakistan pursued a policy of strict non-alignment following military strikes in the wider Middle East in early 2026 in the context of the war on Iran. Islamabad engaged in regional shuttle diplomacy to advocate for de-escalation, even as domestic energy markets faced immediate pressures via elevated import costs and emergency fuel conservation measures. Defence and strategic security ties with Saudi Arabia deepened significantly through bilateral security arrangements, which developed into the Makkah Pact, a trilateral treaty including Türkiye.

Islamabad maintains strategic partnership with Riyadh while keeping open diplomatic channels and border communication with Tehran. Further north, tensions along the Durand Line remained elevated over cross-border militant activity, security incidents, and ongoing formal repatriation initiatives for undocumented Afghan nationals. Along the Line of Control, relations with India remained in a managed diplomatic stalemate marked by occasional security operations, with Islamabad continuing to raise Kashmir’s status at international forums while maintaining a cold, formal bilateral posture with New Delhi.

Pakistan continues to balance its engagement among major global powers. Development proceeded on Phase II of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, focusing on special economic zones, agricultural technology transfers, and power grid modernisations, while Beijing provided critical debt roll-overs to keep Pakistan’s foreign debt servicing requirements manageable. Bilateral engagement with the United States centred on counterterrorism, regional stability, and economic assistance programmes, alongside navigating domestic political reactions to regional American actions. Finally, trade and energy ties with Russia expanded through grain imports, alongside ongoing consultations concerning regional transport infrastructure and long-term energy cooperation.

Islamophobia in Europe and the Americas

Islamophobia, defined as structural discrimination, prejudice, and systemic bias directed against Muslims or those perceived to be Muslim, remains a major global human rights challenge. Monitored by the United Nations, international human rights organisations, and regional advocacy groups, anti-Muslim sentiment manifests across legal, institutional, political, and social spheres.

Across the United States, advocacy groups such as the Council on American-Islamic Relations document high volumes of civil rights complaints, largely concentrated in employment discrimination, immigration processing delays, and institutional surveillance, while anti-Shari‘ah legislative proposals periodically re-emerge at state and federal levels. Anti-Muslim rhetoric regularly intensifies during national election cycles, domestic security debates, and heightened geopolitical conflicts in the Middle East, while physical vandalism, harassment, and security threats against mosques, Islamic community centres, and student organisations present ongoing safety concerns.

Many politicians and officials harbour anti-Muslim sentiments. Pete Hegseth, Defence Secretary, writes in his book, American Crusade, that the United States is under a cultural invasion “not just at our shore, it’s in your community and schools”. His 2020 book states, “Muhammad is now a top ten boys’ name in America.” And that “Our present moment is much like the 11th Century. We don’t want to fight, but, like our fellow Christians one thousand years ago, we must.” “Arm yourself—metaphorically, intellectually, physically. Our fight is not with guns. Yet.”

A quick search of the most popular names in the USA does not include “Muhammad” among them. According to the US Social Security Administration, Muhammad ranked No. 239 in 2025, with 1,473 births, representing 0.080% of total male births in 2025. It is Islamophobia for Hegseth to compare the USA in the 21st century to 11th-century crusaders, who killed Jews, Christians, and Muslims. It is dangerous because Hegseth has the Crusaders’ slogan Deus Vult tattooed on his arm. Closer to his heart, he has a prominent Crusaders’ cross tattooed on his chest.

In the United Kingdom and Europe, monitoring organisations highlight similar reports. The Islamophobia Response Unit documents that discrimination in workplace and educational environments accounts for a major share of reports, with Muslims representing nearly 45% of religious hate crime cases in England and Wales, while Tell MAMA recorded over 6,000 verified online and offline anti-Muslim incidents, marking a significant increase compared to 2022 baseline levels. Furthermore, several European nations maintain legal restrictions on religious attire, including bans or limits on the hijab, niqab, or religious symbols in public schools, civil service roles, and civic institutions, while reports from the Collective Against Islamophobia in Europe highlight that Muslim women wearing head coverings face a disproportionate share of public discrimination, verbal harassment, and employment barriers.

In Australia and within global institutions, systemic responses continue to evolve. A landmark federal report in Australia detailed the institutional impact of Islamophobia, resulting in government-backed security grants for religious institutions and updates to anti-bias educational guidelines.

At the international level, the United Nations designated 15 March as the International Day to Combat Islamophobia and appointed the High Representative for the UN Alliance of Civilizations as the Special Envoy to Combat Islamophobia to coordinate system-wide anti-discrimination strategies.

From a theoretical perspective, Islamophobia intersects closely with xenophobia while operating through distinct socio-political mechanisms. While both could be manufactured, xenophobia denotes a generalised fear or hatred of perceived foreigners, Islamophobia functions through the racialisation of religion, where prejudice attaches religious identity to physical traits, traditional attire, or non-Western naming conventions, operating similarly to racial bias. This construct frames Muslim populations as permanent outsiders who are fundamentally incompatible with national identities, regardless of whether individuals are native-born citizens.

Building on Edward Said’s landmark work Orientalism, critical scholars argue that Western cultural and political discourse historically framed Islam as passive, irrational, or intrinsically violent, allowing Western institutions to define themselves by contrast as rational, secular, and progressive. The Muslim becomes the ultimate Other.

Under this framework, over 2 billion diverse individuals are frequently collapsed into a single homogenised identity, while state security apparatuses reduce Muslim citizens to potential threat categories, normalising exceptional surveillance and civil liberties restrictions. Media and public discourse regularly reinforce these dynamics, where public anxieties surrounding regional conflicts or political debates are at times redirected by political actors into generalised anti-Muslim hostility.

These dynamics are clearly visible in public discourse, where prominent political statements demonstrate how anti-Muslim tropes become normalised in comparison to counter-narratives that emphasise human rights and interfaith understanding. Across global electoral and media spheres, political figures and commentators have integrated explicit anti-Muslim rhetoric into mainstream platforms. In Israel, Haaretz has documented this trend in pieces like As Islamophobia Is Embraced Worldwide, Israel Allows Itself to Let Loose and Welcome to Israel’s Most Racist Election, noting how leaders like Benjamin Netanyahu frantically fuel anti-Arab racism and Islamophobia. A similar pattern appears in American politics; in At Two Jewish Conferences, Speakers Turn Fears of Antisemitism Into Attacks on Islam, Haaretz highlights how some conservative leaders leverage Jewish anxieties about antisemitism by casting Muslims as a central threat in the hope of shifting Jewish voters to the right.

In contrast, former US President Barack Obama highlighted in his 2009 Cairo address that Islam has always been part of America’s story while acknowledging its historic academic contributions. Among religious and intellectual figures, Pope Francis emphasised that authentic Islam and the proper reading of the Qur’an are opposed to every form of violence upon signing the 2019 Document on Human Fraternity, while historian Arnold J Toynbee observed in Civilization on Trial that the elimination of race consciousness among Muslims represents one of the major social achievements of human civilisation.

Conclusion

Inspired by the overarching messages conveyed by Arab and Muslim leaders during the Eighty-First Session of the United Nations General Assembly, a clear consensus emerges regarding the most pressing challenges facing the Arab and Islamic worlds and the strategic frameworks needed to resolve them. Central to this vision is the recognition of the Palestinian issue as the fundamental core of regional stability. Addresses such as that delivered by His Majesty King Abdullah II of Jordan underscored how global crises, including economic disparity, food insecurity, climate disasters, and protracted conflicts, compound humanitarian suffering and directly impact average families worldwide. Addressing this primary challenge requires a unified diplomatic approach: the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) must spearhead coordinated initiatives to halt military operations and civilian displacement across the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, establish sustained humanitarian corridors, and drive post-conflict reconstruction. Concurrently, regional bodies must firmly oppose forced displacement and protect the historical status quo of Muslim and Christian holy sites in East Jerusalem, particularly Al-Aqsa Mosque/Al-Haram Al-Sharif, by rallying behind the Hashemite Custodianship.

HM King Abdullah II reminded world leaders that the Arabs and Muslims extended their hands for peace. The Arab Peace Initiative (2002) called for Israel to end its occupation of all Arab territories occupied since 1967, including the Syrian Golan Heights, and for the establishment of an independent Palestinian State. In return, it offered recognition of Israel and the normalisation of relations with all 22 Arab States, together with security guarantees for all states in the region. King Abdullah II sent a clear message that the international community must take action, asking: “The question now is: will we act? Because the world’s political inaction is not for lack of options. So, let’s call it what it is: a choice. We have tools: sanctions, asset freezes, embargoes, diplomatic isolation. And we have a record of using them elsewhere. Yet with Israel, resolutions end where they begin: on paper.”

Regional instability in countries like Libya, Sudan, Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon is driven by internal conflicts, proxy warfare, and state fragility, which cause severe humanitarian crises and threaten trade routes like the Red Sea. To fix this, external Arab and Muslim nations must stop arming warring factions, act as neutral mediators, dismantle non-state armed groups, and help restore national sovereignty.

The Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamid Al Thani, in addressing the 81st session of the UNGA, warned that the Gulf region is passing through a dangerous phase and stressed the need for a regional collective security system. He advocated for diplomatic dialogue and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to prevent wider conflict. The “regional collective security system” is excellent, but it should be open to all Arab and Muslim states, for all of them are negatively impacted by the current war, and the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb crises.

No long-time security is possible without taking care of economies of all Arab and Muslim states who are at a disadvantage. The region faces a sharp divide between wealthy GCC nations and low-growth, heavily indebted non-oil economies suffering from inflation and high youth unemployment. Solutions require targeted cross-regional investments—such as developing Sudan’s agriculture for regional food security—and accelerating post-oil transitions through investments in renewable energy, AI, infrastructure, and sovereign wealth development. An example of an agreement for futuristic development took place on the sidelines of the 81st session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. The UAE will equip one million Lebanese with generative AI skills.

At the geopolitical level, regional nations are shifting away from sole dependence on traditional Western defence guarantees—now viewed as inadequate—and foreign military bases, choosing instead to pursue strategic multi-alignment by strengthening ties with China, India, and BRICS. To shield against global power dynamics, the region must establish autonomous, self-reliant defence networks, utilising models such as Saudi-Pakistan bilateral pacts, arrangements involving Türkiye, and the 14-nation Arab and Islamic maritime coalition. Ultimately, building a unified pan-Arab and Islamic security framework offers a definitive path toward protecting sovereignty, boosting local defense manufacturing, enabling diplomatic mediation, and driving long-term self-reliant development.

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