The Makkah Pact: A New Architecture of Muslim Power

Lamya Al-Khraisha

A historic trilateral mutual defense pact between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan was signed on 7 August, 2026. The Makkah Joint Defence Agreement (MJDA), dubbed by observers as an ‘Islamic NATO,’ establishes a collective security arrangement modeled closely after NATO’s Article 5, stating that an armed attack against any one of the three member states will be treated as an attack against them all.

The agreement represents a huge shift in Middle Eastern geopolitics, moving toward Ummatic strategic autonomy during a period of severe regional upheaval. The region’s security landscape has been reshaped by Israel’s ongoing genocidal war on Gaza after the October 7 2023 Hamas-led attack on Israel, the ousting of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea, and, of course, the US and Israel war on Iran. There are also growing threats to vital maritime corridors such as the Strait of Hormuz and Bab Al-Mandeb. The Pact signals that major powers of the Ummah are transitioning from passive consumers of Western security to active producers of their own defense.

What is known and what is not

The exact legal text of the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement remains classified, most likely in order to maintain strategic ambiguity. The complete text has not been publicly released, but the broad principles have been disclosed via official joint communiqués and press briefings. What has been published officially is the joint summit statement, not the Pact itself.

Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs published the following: “Guided by the longstanding historical ties among the three States, based on the enduring bonds of brotherhood and Islamic solidarity that unite them, and building upon their shared strategic interests and longstanding defence cooperation … the three States’ shared commitment to further strengthening their collective security and to promoting peace, security, and stability in the region and beyond, in pursuit of a secure and prosperous future … The Agreement is intended to strengthen collective deterrence against any act of aggression, and stipulates that any armed attack against any one of the three States shall be regarded as an attack against them all. It further provides for the enhancement of all aspects of defence cooperation among the three States.”

It is still unknown what the precise definition and geographical scope of an “armed attack” is. And the exact “military commitments” and the precise “conditions” required to invoke the collective defense clause are also not known. Nor is it known if military assistance would be instant, and what form of assistance each state is legally required to provide. This last point is particularly significant considering Pakistan is a nuclear power. It is unclear if Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent indirectly extends to Saudi Arabia and Türkiye, but the ambiguity alone serves as a powerful deterrent to anyone considering an attack on Türkiye or Saudi Arabia as they would have to factor in that they may have a nuclear umbrella.

On 31 August 2026, the three countries convened the first formal meeting of the Strategic Political and Defence Committee in Istanbul, marking the first concrete step towards translating their political declaration into an institutional framework. The defence and foreign ministers agreed to establish a permanent secretariat in Saudi Arabia, initially headed by a Pakistani Secretary-General serving a three-year term, and to strengthen military cohesion through coordinated high-level planning, joint military exercises and collaborative defence-industrial projects.

Complementary military strengths

The Makkah Pact strategically utilises the distinct and highly complementary military strengths of each member nation to establish an operational deterrent force. Saudi Arabia brings tremendous financial power to the table. Türkiye contributes an advanced defense industry, battle-tested soldiers, and high-tech military hardware, including drones and aerospace technology. Pakistan provides manpower and unique missile capabilities, and is of course one of only nine states that possess nuclear weapons and is the only Muslim nation among them.

The nominal GDP of Pakistan is 452.1 billion USD, Türkiye 1.1 trillion USD, and Saudi Arabia 1.3 trillion USD. Saudi Arabia has a modern and well-equipped military which includes more than 1,000 tanks, 449 jets at least, and the largest air-force of the three states. Saudi Arabia already had a mutual defence pact with Pakistan. In 2026 alone Pakistan sent its ally 8,000 soldiers, a squadron of jets and air defence batteries. Türkiye has the second-largest army in NATO after the United States and has almost 2,400 tanks, a rapidly growing sophisticated navy with 13 submarines and an amphibious assault ship plus a growing military-industrial complex that can produce high-tech weapons quickly should the need arise. Pakistan is a nuclear power with strong defence ties to China and has over half a million soldiers, 3 intelligence-gathering satellites, and 1,400 military aircraft, including 422 combat-capable jets, most of them F16s. Collectively the three states form a sizeable military bloc. Between them they have over 6,000 tanks and more than 179,000 armoured vehicles, over 3400 aircraft, more than 340 naval assets, a fleet of drones, ballistic missiles, a nuclear deterrent, and, according to the 2026 Global Firepower Index, nearly 1.4 million active military personnel. Their combined defence budgets amount to about 124.4 billion dollars annually.

Three powers, three motivations

The three countries have different motivations for joining the Pact. Pakistan is battling at least two insurgencies and needs a counterweight to India which said it would monitor the Pact and protect its own national security interests. It also needs money. Türkiye needs a nuclear deterrent against the Israeli rhetoric that has started to focus on Türkiye as the next regional threat to Israel. And Saudi Arabia has an ambitious modernisation vision for itself which is being held back by all the wars and fighting in the region. The three states also juggle divergent geopolitical realities. Saudi Arabia has faced direct attacks on its energy infrastructure by the Islamic Republic of Iran, while Türkiye and Pakistan maintain highly complex diplomatic ties with Iran.

Why the pact emerged now

Israel’s emergence as a regional hegemon with unrestrained military power has implications for all three countries. Arab and Muslim states watched in horror as Israel expanded its military action across the region defying the United States’ half-hearted calls to restrain itself. Israel is constantly threatening Türkiye, and concerns that there will be a military clash between the two regional powers are very real, particularly because of their involvement in Syria. The American umbrella is now viewed as neither guaranteeing peace nor having the best interests of its non-Israeli allies in the region at heart. America is perceived as increasingly tempted by isolationism and incapable of restraining Israel as various international agreements in Lebanon, Gaza, and with Iran have been undermined, leading to a loss of faith in diplomatic mediation by the US. Combining the strengths of the three States demonstrates that the Muslim world can build an independent deterrent capable of navigating global power rivalries.

The succession of conflicts across the Middle East has unsettled the regional order and prompted several countries in the region to reconsider the reliability and future direction of Washington’s security role. Some analysts regard this uncertainty as an important factor behind the pact’s formation; others argue that the agreement remains compatible with the American preference for regional allies to assume a greater share of their own defence. This interpretation also reflects a broader tendency under the Obama and Biden administrations to reduce direct American engagement in the Middle East—a tendency that continued into President Trump’s second term, with the 2025 National Security Strategy devoting limited attention to the region.

Implications for the Ummah

The signing of the agreement in the holy city of Makkah carries intense symbolic resonance for Muslims globally and the text explicitly invokes “the enduring bonds of brotherhood and Islamic solidarity”. That wording deliberately places the agreement within a wider Islamic moral and historical vocabulary. By uniting three of the most powerful Islamic nations under a single mutual-defense umbrella, the pact is being viewed as both a historic symbol of Islamic solidarity and a complex geopolitical development that could fracture or reshape the Muslim world’s internal alliances. For decades, the concept of a pan-Islamic military alliance has been popular within public discourse across the Muslim world. The emergence of this trilateral bloc satisfies a long-standing desire within the Ummah for independent, collective Islamic strength. Public enthusiasm for an ‘Islamic NATO’ also reflects Muslims’ hopes to possess the organised strength to protect themselves.

By using the language of the Ummah, the signatories invite Muslims to judge the pact by more than its service to three national governments. If it protects only regimes and borders while remaining indifferent to catastrophes elsewhere, its invocation of Makkah could become a source of criticism rather than legitimacy.

The pact does not restore the Ummah as a single political actor. It may nevertheless achieve something more modest and more durable: the reintroduction of Islamic solidarity as a meaningful element of interstate strategy. Muslim international politics has too often oscillated between rhetorical pan-Islamism and fragmented nationalism.

Strategic autonomy and collective defence capacity

For approximately eight decades, much of the Middle East’s security architecture has depended upon Western—principally American—military power. The Makkah Pact does not necessarily terminate that security arrangement, rather, it can be seen as strategic diversification of security.

The message is that Muslim states need not choose between dependence upon Washington, Moscow or Beijing; they can build substantial security capacity among themselves. That could ultimately produce a more multipolar Islamic world in which Muslim states possess greater strategic agency.

The agreement may also complicate Washington’s efforts to extend Arab–Israeli normalisation through the Abraham Accords. Saudi participation now appears less likely, particularly after President Trump linked American support for the Kingdom’s civilian nuclear programme to Riyadh’s normalisation of relations with Israel. This linkage has reinforced the perception that the Accords are being employed as a coercive instrument rather than a voluntary tool for regional diplomacy.

Palestine, Israel and the changing regional order

The pact could alter the strategic environment surrounding Palestine, an issue of profound emotional significance to Muslims worldwide. Any such assessment, however, requires caution. So far as the public record indicates, the Makkah Agreement does not oblige its three signatories to defend Palestine or the Palestinian people militarily: its collective-defence provision applies specifically to an attack upon one of the three member states.

Nor has the Pact been officially presented as an alliance against Israel. Pakistan has described it as “purely defensive” and not directed against any country, while Saudi officials have rejected suggestions that it constitutes a military axis. Nevertheless, closer military coordination among Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan could indirectly affect Israel’s strategic calculations by creating a more substantial regional counterweight.

Its more consequential effect may instead be diplomatic. States possessing credible and relatively independent deterrent capabilities enjoy greater freedom of political manoeuvre. If the Pact develops into an effective security arrangement, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye may be able to address the Palestinian question from a position less dependent upon American security guarantees.

Potential expansion

The Makkah Joint Defence Agreement (MJDA) appears to have been conceived as an expandable arrangement rather than a permanently trilateral alliance. Its founding members have indicated that additional states could eventually be admitted, raising the possibility that the Pact may develop into a broader security framework linking several Muslim-majority countries.

Support for this has already emerged from prominent regional figures. Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim Aal-Thani, Qatar’s former prime minister, has encouraged the other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to consider participation. Although his remarks do not constitute an official Qatari application, they reflect growing interest in extending the Pact beyond its three founders.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has likewise confirmed that unnamed governments have shown interest in the arrangement. Egypt has received particular attention because of its military strength, demographic weight, geographical position and longstanding diplomatic influence in the Arab world. Turkish officials have suggested that Cairo could eventually participate once outstanding procedural and legal questions have been resolved. Egyptian membership would substantially increase the Pact’s regional stature and practical capabilities.

Cairo, however, has strong reasons to proceed cautiously. Membership could create military obligations that affect Egypt’s relationship with the United States, which has been one of Egypt’s principal donors, providing more than US$90 billion in aid since 1946, much of it military assistance. It could also affect its peace treaty with Israel and its ability to maintain diplomatic flexibility across competing regional alignments. Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty has indicated that the government is examining the constitutional, legal and technical consequences before reaching a decision.

The possibility of other states joining the pact is not limited to Egypt. Bangladesh has displayed interest, while Qatar and other Gulf states may regard participation as a means of supplementing their existing security partnerships and reducing excessive reliance upon the United States. For Qatar, this question has particular significance following Israel’s September 2025 attack on Doha where Hamas negotiators were considering a US ceasefire proposal. Any expansion, however, would require the founding members to agree that a prospective entrant’s strategic interests, regional disputes and defence obligations are compatible with those of the Pact.

Between Muslim unity and sectarian division

Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan are overwhelmingly Sunni-majority states. A defence alliance among them could easily be interpreted as a Sunni strategic bloc directed at Shi‘a Iran. If that happens, it could deepen rather than overcome divisions within the Ummah. The Saudis appear acutely conscious of this danger. Their officials have explicitly said that the agreement is not a sectarian bloc, and Pakistan has continued diplomatic engagement with Iran. Iran itself avoided treating the pact as hostile and its official reaction was restrained. Tehran said that it did not regard the agreement as necessarily directed against Iran and that regional countries developing their own security arrangements is understandable. For the wider Muslim world, therefore, one test of the agreement will be whether it evolves into an inclusive collective-security arrangement or a Sunni geopolitical coalition. The former could strengthen the Ummah. The latter may institutionalise one of its deepest divisions.

Whether the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement becomes a source of peace and deterrence, greater leverage for the Palestinian cause, technological independence and deeper Muslim unity—or merely another alliance serving the interests of three governments—will depend upon the institutions built around it, the moral vision guiding it and the discipline with which it is implemented. If the Pact lives up to its full potential, the world may come to see it as the beginning of a major restructuring of power in the Muslim world: the moment when Islamic solidarity started to move from sentiment to strategy.

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