The Makkah Peace Accord: Why ASEAN Must Pay Attention

Phar Kim Beng, PhD; and Luthfy Hamzah

The Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, signed by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan on 7 August 2026, should not be regarded as merely another defence arrangement emerging from the turbulence of West Asia. Nor should the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) dismiss it as a distant development belonging to the strategic geography of the Middle East. The agreement deserves to be understood in a much broader sense. It is potentially the beginning of an attempt to construct a new regional security architecture at a moment when confidence in the old international order is weakening.

For ASEAN, therefore, Makkah matters. The agreement brings together three countries possessing very different but complementary forms of power. Saudi Arabia possesses extraordinary financial, energy and religious influence. Türkiye possesses one of the largest and most experienced armed forces in NATO as well as an increasingly sophisticated defence-industrial base. Pakistan possesses a large professional military establishment, considerable strategic experience and, most importantly, nuclear weapons.

Individually, none can completely transform the international system. Together, however, they constitute a formidable strategic triangle connecting West Asia, the Mediterranean, Central Asia, South Asia and, indirectly, the Indo-Pacific. The significance of the agreement is consequently not simply military. It is geopolitical and ASEAN must study it carefully.

From Makkah to a New Security Architecture

The agreement was signed in Makkah by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. Its most striking principle is unmistakable: an armed attack against one of the three countries will be regarded as an attack against all three. That language immediately invites comparison with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. However, the Makkah arrangement should not simply be described as an Islamic NATO since that would be premature and analytically misleading.

NATO emerged from the particular circumstances of post-war Europe and subsequently developed an elaborate integrated military command structure, interoperability arrangements, permanent institutions, intelligence mechanisms, and decades of common strategic planning. The Makkah Agreement is much younger; nevertheless, the direction of travel is important.

The three governments are seeking to institutionalise defence cooperation rather than relying merely upon occasional political consultations. This became clearer on 31 August when the foreign ministers, defence ministers and military chiefs of Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan gathered in Istanbul for the inaugural meeting of the Strategic Political and Defence Committee.

Moreover, the three subsequently agreed to establish a permanent secretariat in Saudi Arabia, initially headed by a Pakistani secretary-general for three years, and also committed themselves to strengthening defence capabilities, military cohesion, defence-industrial cooperation, joint technological development and production. Thus, Makkah is already moving from declaration towards institutionalisation.

Whether it eventually becomes a powerful military arrangement remains uncertain. But ASEAN should pay attention precisely because institutions often begin modestly, and given that ASEAN itself began with five countries signing the Bangkok Declaration in 1967. Few could have imagined then that the association would eventually expand to encompass virtually the whole of Southeast Asia and become the institutional centre of a sprawling regional diplomatic architecture.

Institutions acquire importance through repetition, habit, and accumulated political commitment. The same could eventually occur with Makkah. Hence the question: Why Now?

Security arrangements do not appear in a vacuum. The Makkah Agreement emerged from profound anxiety about the deterioration of the strategic environment across West Asia. The region has witnessed repeated wars, missile attacks, drone warfare, disruption of shipping routes, and intensifying confrontation involving Iran, Israel and the United States.

Comparatively, for decades, the Gulf states relied heavily on American military power as the ultimate guarantor of regional security. That relationship has not disappeared, nor will it disappear soon; but something important has changed. In the latest observation in the Gulf States, regional governments increasingly appear unwilling to place all their strategic eggs in one basket. First, Saudi Arabia has diversified its diplomacy. Second, Türkiye simultaneously remains a NATO member while pursuing substantial strategic autonomy. Third, Pakistan maintains relations with China, the United States, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and other major partners while protecting its own strategic interests. This is not classic neutrality, neither is it simple non-alignment; but it is strategic diversification.

Ultimately, ASEAN should recognise this phenomenon immediately because Southeast Asian countries have practised different versions of it for decades. ASEAN countries do not want China to dominate Asia and neither do they want the United States expelled from the region. What ASEAN really wants is strong relations with Japan, India, South Korea, Australia and the European Union while simultaneously maintaining productive relations with Beijing and Washington. In other words, the instinct underlying the Makkah agreement is not entirely alien to ASEAN. It represents a search for strategic room to manoeuvre.

Regional Ownership

One particularly important concept associated with the agreement is “regional ownership”. This deserves serious ASEAN attention as, for much of modern history, the security architecture of West Asia has been heavily shaped by external powers. For instance, Britain once played this role, then the United States subsequently became the dominant external security provider. Meanwhile, Russia maintained its own strategic presence and China has increasingly developed economic and diplomatic interests throughout the region.

However, the Makkah Agreement suggests that important regional states increasingly believe that they must assume greater responsibility for their own security. ASEAN was founded upon a similar instinct. The creation of ASEAN in 1967 was fundamentally an attempt by Southeast Asian governments to prevent their region from becoming merely an arena in which larger powers settled their rivalries.

That instinct subsequently informed concepts such as the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality and eventually ASEAN centrality from which the lesson was simple. Regional countries must possess sufficient diplomatic agency to shape their own regional environment. Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan now appear to be experimenting with their own version of this principle. However, their methods differ substantially from ASEAN’s.

ASEAN is not a military alliance as it has never possessed collective defence obligations. Its strength has traditionally rested upon diplomacy, consultation, economic integration and institutional networking. Yet the underlying strategic objective has similarities: regional states must not surrender the management of their security completely to outside powers.

Deterrence Can Serve Peace

Hence, it may be useful to think of Makkah not merely as a defence agreement but potentially as a peace accord. Peace cannot always be maintained through goodwill alone. International relations remain shaped by power. States calculate risks, assess capabilities, probe weaknesses and, when deterrence collapses, temptation can arise. The logic behind Makkah appears to be that aggression against one member should carry the possibility of confrontation with all three. Saudi financial resources, Turkish military and technological capabilities and Pakistani military power therefore become mutually reinforcing.

The objective should not be war, but be making war prohibitively expensive; hence, this distinction is essential. Deterrence without diplomacy produces permanent confrontation while diplomacy without credible deterrence can produce strategic vulnerability. Successful statecraft requires both.

Significantly, the three governments emphasised after their Istanbul meeting that their cooperation should support de-escalation, restraint and peaceful resolution of crises. The challenge will be translating these aspirations into actual behaviour. A defence arrangement can stabilise a region when its boundaries and intentions are understood. It can destabilise the same region if competitors interpret it as an offensive coalition. Consequently, transparency and diplomatic engagement will be indispensable.

Pakistan’s Special Role

Pakistan is particularly interesting from an ASEAN perspective. Pakistan is simultaneously a South Asian country, an Indian Ocean power, a nuclear weapons state, an important partner of China, and a country with long-established relations across the Muslim world. Also, its geography connects several strategic theatres: to its east lies India, to its west are Iran and Afghanistan, beyond them lies the Gulf; to the north is China and its maritime frontage opens onto the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean.

Pakistan, therefore, occupies a strategic intersection between South Asia, Central Asia, West Asia and the Indo-Pacific. In this perspective, ASEAN should avoid viewing Pakistan solely through the prism of its rivalry with India as it increasingly matters to the wider strategic architecture connecting the Indian Ocean with Southeast Asia.

Hence, its participation in Makkah reinforces this role more in particular in the nuclear dimension and this inevitably attracts attention as Pakistan remains the only Muslim-majority nuclear-armed state. But assumptions that Makkah automatically extends a Pakistani nuclear umbrella over Saudi Arabia and Türkiye would go beyond that which has been formally established.

Strategic ambiguity itself, however, can affect deterrence calculations. Potential adversaries must now contemplate the possibility that confrontation with one member could generate reactions from the other two. That uncertainty may itself possess deterrent value.

Türkiye and the Defence-Industrial Revolution

Türkiye contributes something equally significant: industrial military capacity. The transformation of Türkiye’s defence sector during recent decades has been remarkable. Turkish drones have become internationally recognised. Its companies manufacture armoured vehicles, naval platforms, missiles, electronics and increasingly sophisticated aerospace technologies. Moreover, Türkiye has consequently moved from being primarily an importer of advanced military systems towards becoming an important producer and exporter.

This carries an important lesson for ASEAN whereby security sovereignty increasingly depends upon technological sovereignty. A country unable to manufacture, maintain or adapt essential defence technologies remains dependent upon external suppliers. This vulnerability becomes particularly serious during international crises when export controls, sanctions or disrupted supply chains can suddenly restrict access to critical components. The Makkah countries have therefore placed considerable emphasis on joint technological development and production. This may eventually prove more important than the dramatic collective-defence clause itself.

Joint factories, research programmes, drone technologies, air-defence systems, electronic warfare, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity and autonomous systems could create durable strategic interdependence among the three countries about which ASEAN should watch these developments closely.

Saudi Arabia: Capital Meets Strategy

Saudi Arabia supplies another essential ingredient: capital. In this contemporary world, modern military technology is extraordinarily expensive, research and development require patient financing. Aircraft, missiles, satellites, cybersecurity systems and artificial intelligence require substantial investment. And Saudi Arabia possesses the financial resources capable of accelerating joint technological projects.

However, Riyadh’s role extends far beyond money as Saudi Arabia remains one of the world’s most important energy producers. Its geographical position gives it enormous importance in the Red Sea, Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula. Its religious status gives it influence throughout the Muslim world.

Its economic transformation under Vision 2030 has also encouraged the kingdom to develop new industries and technological capabilities. Makkah therefore potentially combines Saudi capital, Turkish technology and Pakistani military expertise. This complementarity explains why ASEAN should not underestimate the arrangement. Strategic partnerships become durable when each participant contributes something the others require.

The Energy Connection to ASEAN

There is an even more immediate reason why Southeast Asia should care: energy. ASEAN’s economies remain deeply connected to energy flows originating in West Asia. Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei possess their own hydrocarbon resources, but the wider Asian economy remains heavily dependent upon Gulf energy. For example, Japan, South Korea, China and India depend substantially upon energy imported through maritime routes connecting the Gulf with the Indian Ocean.

Any prolonged disruption of these routes reverberates throughout Asia. Oil prices rise. Shipping insurance and transportation costs increase. The electricity generation becomes more expensive and manufacturing costs rise. This all invites inflation.

ASEAN, therefore, cannot regard West Asian security as geographically remote. A missile launched thousands of kilometres from Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, Bangkok, Manila or Singapore can ultimately affect supermarket prices throughout Southeast Asia. The Strait of Hormuz is consequently connected economically to the Strait of Malacca; the Red Sea is connected to the South China Sea; and the Arabian Sea is connected to the wider Indo-Pacific.

Modern geopolitics has destroyed the luxury of thinking about these waterways separately. They form part of an interconnected maritime circulatory system.

The Indian Ocean Cannot Be Ignored

ASEAN strategic thinking has traditionally concentrated heavily on the South China Sea which is understandably so. But the Indian Ocean is becoming equally important.

A substantial portion of the trade and energy sustaining Southeast Asian economies travels through the Indian Ocean before entering the Strait of Malacca. Countries in the region such as Malaysia and Indonesia literally sit at the intersection of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Singapore’s prosperity is intimately connected to maritime flows linking both oceans, while Thailand is increasingly discussing connectivity across the peninsula. In comparison, too, Myanmar faces the Bay of Bengal. Thus, ASEAN needs a more comprehensive maritime imagination.

The Indo-Pacific cannot merely mean the Western Pacific plus the South China Sea. It must genuinely include the Indian Ocean. The Makkah agreement reinforces this reality because Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye collectively possess influence across strategic corridors connecting the Mediterranean, Red Sea, Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean.

Malaysia Should Pay Particular Attention

Malaysia has additional reasons to observe Makkah carefully. It maintains excellent relations with Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan. Malaysia also possesses considerable credibility in the Muslim world while simultaneously remaining firmly embedded within ASEAN. This gives Kuala Lumpur a potentially useful diplomatic position. However, Malaysia should not seek membership in the Makkah Agreement because there is no strategic necessity to do so since ASEAN’s security culture remains fundamentally different.

Malaysia should develop structured dialogue with the three countries, and the focus could include maritime security, cybersecurity, defence technology, artificial intelligence, drone development, humanitarian operations, disaster relief, peacekeeping, and defence-industrial cooperation. Malaysia should especially study possibilities for joint technological ventures. The future of national security will increasingly depend upon technological ecosystems rather than merely the purchase of finished weapons. Countries capable of designing systems, writing software, manufacturing components and maintaining equipment will possess considerably greater strategic autonomy.

ASEAN Must Not Become a Military Alliance

ASEAN should, nevertheless, avoid drawing the wrong lesson. The Makkah agreement does not mean ASEAN should create its own Article 5. That would contradict ASEAN’s historical development and could divide the organisation. Southeast Asia contains widely differing security relationships while some ASEAN countries are treaty allies of the United States. Others maintain extremely close strategic relationships with China and several practise various forms of non-alignment. By attempting to impose a collective military commitment upon such diversity would probably weaken rather than strengthen ASEAN.

ASEAN’s comparative advantage lies elsewhere. It creates diplomatic platforms, encourages habits of consultation, and provides institutional spaces where competing powers can communicate. The ASEAN Regional Forum, East Asia Summit and ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus reflect this tradition. ASEAN should, therefore, strengthen what it does best while learning selectively from Makkah. In the end, one lesson deserves particular attention: institutions must evolve when their strategic environment changes.

From ASEAN Centrality to Strategic Capability

ASEAN frequently invokes “ASEAN centrality” but centrality cannot survive indefinitely as rhetoric. It must be supported by economic capability, technological capability, maritime capability, diplomatic capability, institutional capability and, increasingly, cybersecurity and artificial-intelligence capability. The Makkah Agreement demonstrates that middle powers are searching for new forms of strategic cooperation because the international environment is becoming less predictable.

ASEAN faces exactly the same world. The rivalry between the United States and China continues and the wars in West Asia and Eastern Europe demonstrate the persistence of hard power. In exacerbating the issue, artificial intelligence is transforming military affairs, drones have democratised precision warfare, and cyber operations can cripple infrastructure without conventional invasion. Meanwhile, supply chains have become instruments of geopolitical competition while energy security remains fragile. ASEAN cannot respond to these developments simply by repeating established diplomatic formulas. Centrality must be continuously earned.

A World of Regional Strategic Networks

Makkah may also reveal something larger about the future international order. The world may not be moving towards a simple bipolar confrontation between the United States and China. Instead, the emerging order may consist of overlapping networks of powers. For instance, BRICS is expanding, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation continues to develop, the Quad operates in the Indo-Pacific, and AUKUS is developing advanced military-technological cooperation.

The Gulf states increasingly practise multi-directional diplomacy. Türkiye operates simultaneously within NATO and across Eurasia and the Muslim world. India participates in the Quad while retaining strategic autonomy and participating in BRICS. Saudi Arabia maintains strong relations with Washington while deepening relations with Beijing and other Asian powers. Indonesia engages widely without abandoning its traditional, independent and active foreign policy. Malaysia works with China, the United States, the European Union, Japan, India, the Gulf states and BRICS partners.

This is not a neatly divided world. It is a polytropus world. States increasingly move across multiple diplomatic and strategic networks simultaneously. The Makkah Agreement is another manifestation of this emerging architecture.

ASEAN’s Opportunity

ASEAN should, therefore, not ask whether Makkah is good or bad. The more useful question is what it reveals about the direction of international politics, growing demand for regional ownership, declining willingness among middle powers to rely exclusively upon great-power protection, the increasing connection between defence security, technological sovereignty and industrial policy, the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean. This demonstrates that countries with different capabilities can pool their comparative advantages and manifests that deterrence and diplomacy need not necessarily be opposites.

These lessons are extremely relevant to ASEAN. The association should strengthen strategic dialogue with Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan individually and, where appropriate, collectively. ASEAN-GCC relations provide one existing institutional bridge while ASEAN’s relationships with Türkiye and Pakistan provide others. Rather than creating another enormous bureaucracy, practical cooperation should begin with specific areas where interests overlap.

Maritime domain awareness is one, counterterrorism is another, cybersecurity is increasingly essential, artificial intelligence governance deserves attention, energy security is unavoidable, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief remain natural areas for cooperation, and defence-industrial dialogue could also become increasingly useful.

Peace Through Multipolar Responsibility

Ultimately, the importance of Makkah lies in the possibility that regional powers are beginning to accept greater responsibility for maintaining their own regional order. That development contains risks since regional alliances can become confrontational as security dilemmas can intensify. One country’s deterrence can become another country’s perceived threat which history contains numerous examples of alliances intended to preserve peace that ultimately contributed to conflict.

Makkah must therefore remain connected to diplomacy as its members should maintain dialogue with Iran, with Israel where possible, and should continue engaging the United States, China, Russia, India, Europe and neighbouring states. Deterrence should create the political space for diplomacy rather than replace diplomacy.

ASEAN understands this principle better than many regions. Its survival for nearly six decades has depended upon keeping communication alive even when relations between its members or external partners became difficult. However, the ASEAN method can sometimes appear slow as it can occasionally seem excessively cautious—however, strategic patience has value.

Perhaps this is where ASEAN and the Makkah countries can learn from one another. Makkah demonstrates the importance of credible capability while ASEAN demonstrates the importance of continuous dialogue—and the future regional order may require both.

Makkah Is Closer Than It Looks

The Makkah Joint Defence Agreement should, therefore, not be dismissed as an event occurring far beyond Southeast Asia. Geography no longer permits such complacency. As West Asia and Southeast Asia are increasingly connected through energy, trade, maritime routes, finance, technology, religion and geopolitics, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan are all increasingly important middle powers. ASEAN itself consists predominantly of middle and smaller powers attempting collectively to preserve strategic autonomy.

Their experiences, therefore, intersect. Makkah represents one possible response to the uncertainties of the emerging multipolar order, while ASEAN represents another. One relies more explicitly upon deterrence and the other relies primarily upon diplomatic institutionalisation—neither model is necessarily sufficient on its own.

The strategic challenge of the twenty-first century will be finding ways to combine deterrence, diplomacy, development and dialogue without allowing any single dimension to overwhelm the others.

For Malaysia, the lesson is particularly clear. Kuala Lumpur should remain anchored in ASEAN while widening its strategic horizons. It should understand developments from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean, from the South China Sea to the Arabian Sea, and from the Strait of Malacca to the Strait of Hormuz.

Malaysia does not need to join every emerging arrangement. But it must understand them, engage, and should learn from all. Also, where Malaysia’s national interests coincide with those of emerging regional coalitions, it should cooperate pragmatically without sacrificing ASEAN centrality or strategic autonomy.

The Makkah Agreement is still young, the durability has not been tested and its precise military implications remain uncertain; and differences among Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan will inevitably arise. Whether the Agreement becomes a genuine security institution or merely another diplomatic declaration will depend upon implementation.

However, its establishment already tells us something important: that the international order is changing. Regional powers no longer want merely to wait for Washington, Beijing, Moscow or Brussels to determine their strategic choices. They are actively shaping their own environments. That is why Makkah matters, and why ASEAN must pay attention.

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